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Abstracts
Title Memorandums of Understanding on port State control:
Need for a Global MOU?
Degree MSc
The dissertation is a study of existence of substandard ships and the means to
eradicate them, to ensure safety and protection of the environment. Further more
the basis and development of co-operation in port State control in various region is
discussed.
A brief look is taken on the circumstances leading to Indian Ocean Memorandum of
Understanding (IOMOU), the flag State role in the implementation of IMO
conventions and the role of classification societies in eradicating substandard ships.
Port State control is seen as a crucial step towards eradication of substandard
ships. It acts as a safety net when the shipowner, classification society, flag State or
insurer has in one way or another failed to do their job.
The adoption of Regional Co-operation arrangement - MOU’s- in port State control
is the only alternative and most effective means available to eradicate substandard
ships and to protect the lives of seafarers and the marine environment.
Paris MOU on port State control, adopted in 1982, was the result after the grounding
of “Amoco Cadiz”, off the French Coast. It was the first port State control co-
operation system in the world. Now there are seven Regional co-operations in place
and more to be adopted.
Port State control has become a worldwide-accepted concept. To make MOU’s
successful, co-operation and exchange of information between MOU’s is essential,
so as to curtail the plying of the vessels, which have been targeted by one of the
MOU. Regional MOU’s bring harmonization in the standard of survey by all States
by imparting training to all port State control officers, so as to achieve uniform
vii
standard of inspection. A study of various MOU’s on port State control has been
carried out by the author.
The concluding chapters examine the prospects of a Global MOU on port State
control with a co-operation between all the MOU’s, so as to have a complete data
bank and exchange of information on substandard ships. Exchange of information is
vital for keeping a track on a ship.
Key words: Memorandum of Understanding, Substandard ships, Harmonization,
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
“As the new Millennium unfolds, we can be sure that the rate of change will accelerate and it
would be brave- or perhaps reckless- to try to predict what shipping will look like in ten year’s
time, let alone in fifty or a hundred. That it will be very different is certain. But I would expect
that, above all, it will be safer, because shipping safety and environmental protection are
higher on the political agenda and are IMO’S most important objective and will still be our
priority in the near and distant future” (Mr. William A. O’ Neil).
Ships and the management of ships represent one of man's oldest economic
enterprises. Today, approximately 35,000 ships of ocean going size ply the sea
routes. What has changed with the time are the types of ships from sailing ships to
modern high-speed crafts.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has developed many international
conventions to protect the safety of the crew, cargo, and the environment. Maritime
accidents still happen resulting in losses of lives, property, and damage to the
marine environment due to, among other reasons, increased merchant fleet age,
improper maintenance on board ships to reduce costs, increasing lack of
experienced crew due to shortage of trained manpower and non-compliance with
minimum international safety standard.
In the chain of responsibility the shipowner is ultimately responsible for the safety of
his vessels at sea. He must ensure that ship and crew always comply with
international convention regulations. The shipowner must make sure that the ship
and equipment are maintained to keep the prescribed level for safety at sea.
The flag State and classification societies play the most important role in ensuring
that the shipowners and operators comply with all the regulations. Flag States must
conduct inspections to ensure compliance with the requirements; the same applies
2to the classification society entrusted to carry out statutory inspections on behalf of a
flag State.
To have an effective lasting solution to ship safety problems co-operation of all
participants in the international shipping industry is required. The IMO, flag States,
port States, classification societies, shipowners, managers, crews, insurance
underwriters, charterers, ship financiers and cargo owners all need to participate to
have safer ships and cleaner oceans.
Now the question arises, what happens if the shipowner and the flag State fail to do
their job, as required, to ensure the safety of the vessel and the environment. There
is no check on the vessel after the issuance of the certificates, till the time they are
due for annual or renewal survey. In other words, there is no inspection on the
vessel for nearly a period of twelve months.
The shipowner will not carry out any rectification of the defects, if it is not interfering
with his day to day operation of the vessel. For example, if a lifeboat is lost at sea
due to bad weather and the Master requests a new lifeboat, the owner will take
action only if he is concerned about the safety of his employees. Otherwise he may
delay till the next safety equipment survey falls due.
To overcome the problem of unseaworthy ships run by unscrupulous operators was
one of the reasons why port State control came into existence. Even some of the
classification societies and flag State Administrations failed to comply with the
requirements of the International Maritime Conventions in one way or the other. Now
the target of IMO is to cover the entire world with different Memoranda of
Understanding (MOU) on port State control.
The first International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), adopted in
1914, already contained a provision calling for the control of ships while in the ports
of contracting governments and from then on, in some form or the other, such
provisions have been made in most of the international conventions dealing with
safety and environment protection.
3So we can say that port State control is to eliminate substandard ships from
operating, and at the same time also to confirm that ships which are operating are
complying with all international conventions. In the following chapters there is
discussion on substandard ships. What is a substandard ship? A ship is regarded as
substandard if the hull, accommodation, machinery or equipment for radio, life
saving and fire fighting are below the standards required by the relevant convention.
A ship is substandard if she is not in a possession of valid statutory certificates, or if
she presents a threat to marine environment (Ulstrup).
“Substandard ship” has been defined in IMO Resolution A.787 (19) in Chapter 1.6.9
as “A ship whose hull, machinery, equipment or operational safety is substantially
below the standards required by the relevant convention or whose crew is not in
conformance with the safe manning document.”
To identify a ship, which does not meet the above definition as a substandard ship
may sometimes be a difficult task for the port State control officer. A ship to be
called a substandard ship has to be substantially below the standard required by the
convention. The officer carrying out inspection has to be experienced, as he
ultimately has to decide on the spot the action to be taken.
Initially very few States having major interests in shipping were involved in maritime
safety and pollution prevention. For example, following the Court of Formal
Investigation into the loss of the Titanic, representatives from just 13 States
attended the international conference convened by the United Kingdom in London in
1913 (Cowley, 1989a).
In order to deter the operation of deficient vessels, coastal States decided to
increase their supervision and entered into regional agreements. It was also
recognized that to prevent unsafe ships from being diverted to ports and regions
where port State control standards are minimized or not enforced procedures of port
State control must be uniformly applied in all parts of the world.
4The tendency of European and North American shipowner’s to flag out their ships to
open registers accelerated toward the end of 1970. As the foreign ships safety
standard started to decline the Hague Memorandum of Understanding was
established in 1978 by eight North Sea States Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal
Republic of Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
six monthly frequency of information exchange was too low to be of any result. In
January 1982 the Hague Memorandum was superseded by the Paris MOU, with the
additional participation of Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. In
1994, Canada became a full member (Cowley, 1995b).
Resolution A. 682(17), entitled “Regional Co-operation in the control of Ships and
Discharges” recognizes the important contribution to maritime safety and pollution
prevention made through regional co-operation. The resolution invites Governments
to consider concluding regional agreements on the application of port State control
measures in co-operation with IMO.
It can thus be said that the Paris MOU was the beginning of the era of Regional
MOU’s on port State control. The last one signed on between States is known as the
Black Sea MOU. After the Paris MOU came the Tokyo MOU, formerly known as the
MOU on port State control in the Asia pacific region, and the last two MOU’s signed
are the West and Central Africa Region signed on 22nd October 1999 and Black Sea
MOU signed on 7th April 2000. Remaining to be signed is the Persian Gulf Region.
But will this solve the ongoing problem of substandard ships from plying? Will
MOU’s be sufficient or would we require more control and monitoring of the
substandard ships.
Regional MOU’s may be able to control the ships plying in their region, but nothing
stops the owners from plying in other parts of the world. Presently, all the MOUs are
not in a position to implement the control due to shortage of funds and lack of
trained manpower. There are many maritime states, which do not have the
necessary expertise in port State control inspection. The surveyors are new in this
area of carrying out port State control. To do that in a reasonable manner the
surveyor should have sufficient knowledge. Whatever training may be imparted to
5him, it is the experience which will be a tool for him to carry out port State
inspection.
The port States cannot ignore the shipping industries and shipowner’s concern with
regard to different standards of port States control inspections and a lack of
harmony. The issue was raised at a meeting of the Asian Shipowner’s forum (ASF)
safe Navigation meeting held in Singapore. A communiqué issued by the Committee
highlighted the owners concern about the rising number of inconsistent and non-
uniform inspection standards adopted by port State control (Bousen, 1999a).
Port State control inspection is different from flag State inspection. The flag State
surveyor or recognized organizations carry out inspection for the issuance of
statutory certificates. That survey can be carried out at a time decided by the owner
and surveyor whereas the port State has to be completed during the call of the
vessel at the port. The main difference between the two, is that the first one is on
owner’s request and the latter, i.e. the port State, is not a statutory requirement for
the owner, but a check on his vessel by the port States. That is one of the reasons
why the port State control officer is not always a welcome guest on board ship.
What the Paris MOU basically did was that 14 member States joined their forces to
make the inspection more stringent and deter the shipowner of an unseaworthy ship
from sailing his vessel. Initially shipowners and developing states for various
reasons did not take it in a good spirit.
When we talk about IMO initiatives or new conventions, it always reminds us of
some disaster, from Titanic to Exxon Valdez. While writing this dissertation, there
have been quite a number of accidents in the last 6 months. There is no doubt that
in the future the name of the tanker Erika will be included in most maritime disaster
discussions. At the same time it is quite certain that no new convention will come
from IMO due to the breaking of Erika, as we already have enough which should
have taken care of tankers like Erika!
6It is one of the weak links between the flag State, classification society, owner or
others, which must have been responsible for such a drastic disaster in maritime
history. Questions are being raised as to what the port States are doing? But port
State control is not responsible for the seaworthiness of the vessel as such! It’s a
spot check, because a port State control officer is not expected to check the
construction defects, especially not inside the tanks, unless there is some evidence
of structural failure. How can a port State control officer go inside the tanks of the
tanker without gas freeing, etc? The question should be raised with the International
Association of Classification Societies (IACS) and the flag State. It’s like doing a
post-mortem now. Will we learn any lesson from this? May be for a few months,
charterers might be careful in chartering old vessels and port State control may be
more vigilant, but is this a solution?
No doubt the port State has taken the leading role in eliminating substandard ships,
but it should not be taken as the ultimate solution. The cost of implementing port
State control is one of the factors, which comes as a hindrance for the developing
States. The other area, which has been discussed in the maritime industry, is about
the different standards of port State inspection. To achieve a harmonized level of
inspection through out the Globe, what is required is a co-operation between all the
MOU’s. To achieve co-operation and co-ordination between different port State
regimes, a global network of information exchange is essential.
Inspite of stringent controls by classification societies, flag States, port State control,
insurers and brokers, substandard ships do exist. The report of various MOU’s and
the US Coast Guard confirms this. Port State control is no substitute for effective
flag State control and, on its own, unlikely to eliminate substandard ships. What
effective port State control can do is to prevent some loss of life and may reduce
environmental pollution.
No ships are allowed to leave port without having all statutory certificates. Port
clearance is only supposed to be given after sighting all the statutory certificates.
Responsibility for issuing these certificates lies with the flag States or by the
classification society if delegated to do so. Then why is it difficult to identify
7substandard ships? The infrastructure is there; it is not a difficult task to identify the
sub-standard ships as information exists in some form or another. The main problem
appears to be that the information is not available to all concerned.
The port State control regime has achieved substantially in eradicating substandard
ships since the inception of the Paris MOU. The other advantage is that shipping
companies hesitate in taking a chance to allow their ships to operate in substandard
condition. In the pre port State control days, owners were not as particular about the
requirements of the ship. But now they are aware that the ship may be detained and
it is an expensive affair if his ship is detained. He would rather comply with the
requirements then have his ship detained.
Now we have eight MOU’s in different regions. But just having MOU’s is not going to
solve the problem. Exchange of information among all the MOU’s will be far more
beneficial in eradicating substandard ships, so as to restrict them from operating in
any of the regions. If we take a look at other regions, we see that the USA
introduced stringent port State control long before the MOU came into being. The
lack of uniformity in the implementation of port State control has been a topic for
discussion since the first port State control inspection began in the early 1980.
In the following chapters the author has discussed the role of the flag States,
classification societies and others responsible for the safety of ships. In chapter 2
discussion has been made about the Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding
(IOMOU). In Chapter 3 the role of the flag State has been discussed and Chapter 4
deals with the classification societies. In chapter 5 the author has reflected the need
for harmonized regional procedures and a global MOU on port State control.
8Chapter 2
Circumstances leading to Indian Ocean MOU
“There is no doubt in my mind that the emphasis should be on the implementation of existing
standards rather then on the development of new measures. There is little point in piling
more regulations on top of those, which are already in place but are being ignored, by some
sections of the industry” (Mr. William A. O’ Neil).
2.1 Background
A prominent feature of current policy in the IMO is its aggressive emphasis on the
implementation of international conventions (Payoyo). With a view to eradicating
substandard ships, the Assembly of the IMO adopted in November, 1991 Resolution
A.682 (17) “Regional Co-operation in the Control of Ships and Discharges” to
propose the establishment of port State control regimes in the various regions of the
world following the pattern adopted by the European region through the Paris
Memorandum of Understanding in 1982 (Plaza, 1999a).
The concept of having the IOMOU was mooted on the basis of a review of adequacy
of the regions maritime safety infrastructure, as well as requirements in accordance
with the I M O, carried out during the period August 1997 to September 1997. It was
felt that a regional co-operation for the States on the Indian Ocean rim, would be the
solution to control the plying of sub-standard ships in the region.
By having regional co-operation on port State control, ships can then be inspected
and a reporting system can be introduced to inform the other coastal States within
the region about the condition of inspected ships and to deter the owners from
plying sub-standard ships, especially those which have been targeted by other
MOU’S. The recent case of the tanker Erika that caused a severe oil spill on the
9French coast should now be an example for all concerned, so that no substandard
ships are allowed to operate. The case of tanker Erika will be discussed in more
detail in later chapters.
A brief report on IOMOU. (Source: Secretariat, IOMOU)
Delegations from Australia, Bangladesh, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Kenya,
Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Myanmar, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, South
Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Yemen attended the first preparatory meeting on
the developing of flag and port State capabilities in the Indian ocean rim. The
meeting was held from 13th to 17th October, 1997, at Mumbai, India at the invitation
of the Secretary General of the IMO, and following the generous offer of the
Government of India, to host the meeting.
The second preparatory and signatory meeting was held between 1st and 5th June
1998, at Pretoria, South Africa, hosted by the Government of South Africa. A draft
Memorandum was drawn at this meeting, which was subsequently finalized. In
addition to the countries mentioned earlier, Sudan also participated in this meeting.
The MOU on port State control for the Indian Ocean, was signed, subject to
acceptance, by the representatives of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Kenya,
Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Tanzania and Yemen.
The Memorandum was kept open for signature, at the headquarters of the
Secretariat i.e. Goa, India, from 5th June 1998 to 22nd January 1999. During this
period of time, the following countries signed the Memorandum of Understanding:
Australia Sudan Tanzania
India  Eritrea South Africa
The Mauritius Administration acceded to the MOU on 15th October 1999, and the
Sri Lanka Administration on 8th November. The other countries are yet to convey
their acceptance or accession. From the above, it is clear; that this Memorandum of
Understanding, which came into effect from 1st April 1999, is at its infancy as
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compared to the other five MOU’s, that are already in force and the seventh MOU,
for West and Central Africa, has been recently signed.
2.2 Functioning of various members
Initially eighteen States had participated in the meetings, but later Singapore,
Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines decided to keep away from the IOMOU as they
had already joined Asia Pacific Memorandum of Understanding. At present only
eight States are full-fledged members namely:
Australia Sri Lank India Sudan
Mauritius Tanzania Eritrea South Africa
The reasons for not acceding to the MOU may be mainly because of economic
considerations. Eighteen States are signatory to the Memorandum, the majority of
them do not have strong maritime administrations. As a result, port State control is
at its infancy in most of the signatory member States. However, most of the States
realizing the need for strong port State control have started appointing persons with
seafaring background and training in port State control.
During the discussion with the Secretary of IOMOU, he informed that they are
planning to have training for port State control officers, belonging to the member
States.  IOMOU is also developing a manual for the port State control officers.
By having their port State control officers trained, in the same way all member
States will have a harmonized system of port State control through out the region. It
is understood that even the MOU’s are trying to have a harmonized approach in port
State control inspection. Mutual cooperation and interaction between IOMOU and
Tokyo MOU is existing in the same manner as is being done in Paris and Tokyo
MOU. The advantage of this will be that right from the beginning the approach will
be in a harmonized manner.
The second meeting of the IOMOU on port State control was held at Mauritius in the
month of December 1999. Only seven member States attended the meeting, which
is not very encouraging for the IOMOU, which has recently started functioning. The
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Chairman of the IOMOU in his address during the second meeting also showed his
disappointment at the lack of commitment by the member States. He further stated
that he could only surmise that other more serious commitments have kept the
representatives away or that a lack of funding preludes their attending this meeting.
No doubt, member States of IOMOU are not amongst the richest in the world, but
the financial problem should not be a hindrance in implementing the port State
control in the region. The whole concept of regional MOU’s will not work if all
member States do not participate in the functioning of the MOU.
However it is not the only MOU where member States may be facing financial
problems as we see from the report of Secretary General of the maritime
organization for West and Central Africa, citing an example of how dire the lack of
funding has become, doubts have been raised whether the MOU on port State
control, will take effect. Why? Because the member States are too poor to pay even
their IMO dues, so the entire process could become effectively invalid (“West African
Shipping-------”).
The Secretariat of the IOMOU since the conclusion of the Second Preparatory
meeting at Pretoria, was operational, on an interim basis from the Directorate
General of Shipping (DGS), Mumbai, India. Secretariat and the Interim Information
center started functioning from its own premises at Goa, India from 1st June 1999. At
present the Secretariat operates on an interim basis and it has to move from interim
to full in April 2001.
2.3 Jurisdiction
IMO has made a number of international conventions for the safety of life and
pollution prevention at sea, and for improving the working and living conditions on
board ships. Port State jurisdiction is largely exercised through port State control
which is provided under major IMO Conventions such as SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW,
Load Line, and also ILO Convention 147.
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The blue print for port State control is contained in the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in respect of Safety and Pollution. UNCLOS Part XII
Articles 218, 226,are the main provisions and other articles are 217, 222, 223,224,
225, 226, and 228. Article 25, paragraph 2, provides that the Coastal State has the
right, in the case of ships proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port facility
outside internal waters, to take the necessary measures to prevent any breach of
the conditions to which admissions to internal water is subject.
Article 211 Paragraph 3, of the convention provides the basis for the establishment
by a group of States of particular requirements for the prevention, reduction and
control of pollution of the marine environment as a condition for the entry of foreign
vessels into their ports or internal waters  (Report on UNCLOS to UN).
Article 218 deals with investigation and proceedings in respect of any discharge
from the vessel out side the internal waters territorial sea or exclusive economic
zone of that State in violation of applicable international rules and standards
established through the competent international organization. However Article 218
imposes some restriction on port State jurisdiction. It states that no proceedings
shall be initiated in respect of a discharge violation in the internal waters, territorial
sea or exclusive economic zone of another State unless requested by that State.
States may undertake an investigation when a vessel is voluntarily within a port or at
an offshore terminal of a State, where the evidence so warrants, and also institute
proceedings if any discharge has taken place from the vessel.
Article 218 mainly deals with discharge violation, and port State jurisdiction is limited
to that. Article 220 deals with the enforcement by the Coastal State and authorizes
the port State to investigate proceedings in respect of violation of applicable laws
and regulations by the foreign vessels, which are voluntarily within a port or offshore
terminal.
“In the absence of a substantial relationship between the LOS convention, port State
provisions and the MOU’s, port State jurisdiction to date has witnessed a greater
development at the regional level, by means of the commitments undertaken by
13
States pursuant to the regional MOU’s and in the case of European Community
States, by reasons of the entry into force of the European Commission directive. In
the future, such linkage between the LOS Convention and the MOU’s may evolve,
into a mutually beneficial relationship between the Regional and Global regime”
(Keselji).
2.3.1 IMO Assembly Resolution pertaining to port State control
1. Resolution A. 321(IX), Procedure for the Control of ships Relating to SOLAS 60
and 1966 LL Convention adopted by IMO during its ninth session in 1975.
2. Resolution A. 390(X), Procedure for the Control of ships relating to the SOLAS
60 and LL1966 Conventions. This convention was adopted on 14th Nov.1977.
3. Resolution A. 391(X), Procedure for the Control of discharges relating to oil
pollution, 1954 as amended in 1962and 1969, adopted during the tenth session
on 14th Nov.77.
4. Resolution A. 466(XII), Procedure for the Control of Ships relating to the
application. Provisions of the SOLAS and 1966 ILL conventions adopted during
the 12th session on Nov.1981.
5. Resolution A. 481(XII), Principles of Safe Manning, adopted during the 12th
session on Nov.1981. Resolution A. 542(XIII), Procedure for the Control of Ships
and Discharges relating to the annex 1 of MARPOL 73/78 adopted during the
13th session on 17th Nov.1983 as a substitute to Resolution A. 392(X).
6. Resolution A. 542(XIII), Procedure for the Control of Ships and Discharges
relating to the annex 1 of Marpol 73/78 adopted during the 13th session on 17th
Nov.1983 as a substitute to Resolution A. 392(X).
7. Resolution A. 597(XV), Amendments to Resolution A. 466(XII) adopted during
the 15th session on November 1987.
8. Resolution A. 682(17), Regional Co-operation in the control of ships and
discharges.
9.  Resolution A. 742(18), Procedure for the Control of Operational requirements
related to the Safety of Ship and Pollution Prevention.
10. Resolution A. 787(19), Procedures for port States control adopted at the 19th
session in 1995.
14
11. Resolution A. 882(21), Amendments to the procedures for the port State control,
updating the 1995 resolution adopted at 21st assembly, in November 1999.
12. MSC/Cir.890- MEPC /Cir.354 on Interim guidelines for port State control related
to the ISM Code.
13. MEPC 26(23), Procedure for the Control of Ships and discharge under Annex II
of Marpol 73 /78.
2.3.2 Relevant IMO Conventions
The International Convention of Safety of life at Sea (SOLAS)
The earliest international convention on safety of life at sea was drafted in 1929
before IMO came into existence, and has since been revised in 1948, 1960 and
1974. SOLAS 1974 was also amended in 1978 by a protocol and entered into force
from May 1981.
Regulation 19, of Chapter1, incorporates the right and obligation of port States to
verify that certificates on board are valid and that they are issued under provision.
Regulation 4 of chapter XI deals with operational requirements in respect of the
safety of ships, when there are clear grounds for believing that the master or crews
are not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating to the safety of ships.
Article 1(3) of the 1988 Protocol relating to the SOLAS deals with ships of non-
parties to the convention and the Protocol. It states that the parties to the present
Protocol shall apply the requirements of the Convention and the present Protocol as
may be necessary to ensure that no more favorable treatment is given to ships of
non-parties to the convention. That is, port State control is not only limited to ships
flying the flag of contracting parties.
The International Convention on Standard of Training Certificate and Watch
keeping for Seafarers (STCW)
Seafarers play an important role in the growth of shipping and are as important as
an ocean is for the ship to sail. Well, just the seafarer in this competitive world is not
enough, they have to be trained and competent for the duties they are assigned on
board the vessel.
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The STCW convention was the first to establish basic requirements on training,
certification and watch keeping for seafarers on an international level. Article X,
Regulation I/4; STCW Code sections A-I/4, and Section B-I/4 incorporates the rights
and obligation for the control. It has been confirmed that more than 80% of the
accidents takes place due to human error.
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships
MARPOL 73/78; Article 5(2) and (3), Article 6(2), (3), (4) and (5), provides the right
and obligation for the port States to carry out inspections. It also contains provisions
concerning inspections of ships at ports to verify whether they have discharged any
harmful substances in contravention of the provisions of the Convention.
Annex I, Regulation 8 A; Annex II, Regulation 15; Annex III, Regulation 8; Annex V,
Regulation 8 deals with the control. Details are given in each regulation as to the
requirement for control. For example, Regulation 8 of Annex II requires Parties to
MARPOL 73/78 to appoint or authorize surveyors for the purpose of implementing
the regulation.
International Convention on Load Line
Article 21, is basically to ensure that a ship is not loaded beyond the limits allowed
by the certificate, and that the Load Line corresponds with the certificate. It also
contains provision to confirm that no alterations are made after the issue of the
certificate.
International Convention on Tonnage measurement
Article 12 of International convention on Tonnage measurement of ships, 1969
(Tonnage 69) contains provisions for the verification of the Tonnage certificate.
Although the convention is not a safety convention as such, but it is important to
determine which conventions are applicable to a specific ship. Assembly Resolution
A.787 (19) procedures for the port State control provides additional guidelines for
the port State control 1under the tonnage convention.
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Ratifying States to exercise control on foreign ships at its ports, even if the flag State
has not ratified and shall relate to Minimum Age, Medical Examination,
Accommodation of Crew, Food and Catering, Officers Competency Certificates and
safety on board ships.
2.4 Present status of member States of IOMOU
The committee during their first meeting of IOMOU had agreed to the work program
for the first year of operation, as follows:
• preparation of a manual for port State control officers;
• publishing of details of training courses for port State control officers;
• approaching the Tokyo MOU for assistance with regard to the IT system;
• publishing statistics on port State control inspections, on a monthly basis;
• publishing of a quarterly newsletter, informing members of the latest
developments;
• publishing an annual report after the second Committee meeting.
The progress made is enumerated below.
The Secretariat has put up a proposal for the signatory and member States of
IOMOU to nominate port State control officers for training, but except for Tanzania,
no other Authorities responded.
How can we except a MOU to achieve its goal if all the member States do not
participate in all the related activities. Is it just an obligation on part of a State to be a
member of one of the MOU on port State control? Or is it that by just being a
member, all obligations towards eradicating substandard ships are over? These are
the matters, which require attention of all concerned, if we have to achieve our goal
of eradicating substandard ships to operate in the Ocean.
For publishing of statistics on port State control on a monthly basis, all the member
States are not forwarding the reports to the Secretariat, except for AMSA, SAMSA,
India and Sudan. As we observe from the above table.
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Table 2A- Details of port State control inspection by IOMOU Members.










Australian Maritime Safety Authority 896 48 96
South African Maritime Authority 197 8 31
Director General of Shipping (India) 117 67 920
Maritime Administration Directorate
(Sudan)
Not available 14 16
Source: Secretariat –IOMOU
As seen from the above statistics which is only for a period of five months, the
number of ships detained are 137 out of the total 1210 inspected by different
Administrations, which comes to 11%. Definitely this figure will increase, when the
member States are better equipped with trained officers and other facilities. These
ships would have been operating if there were no port State control or rather in
much worse condition, as there was no fear of being detained, as these deficiencies
were when the operator was aware that port State control may inspect the vessel.
Reasons for the above may be either that the shipowner or operator is taking a
calculated risk, like a gamble. If he escapes he has made his money or he feels
even if the vessel is detained, he has made his voyage and at the same time the
money.
From the above data even though it is only for a very short period it appears that the
vessels calling at some ports are either complying with all regulations and are in
good condition or the port State control inspection standard is not the same in all the
regions, going by the figure of number of ships detained and deficiencies observed
by those authorities.
The author is not concluding by the above figure that the number of ships detained
or deficiencies observed by the Authorities should be taken as the parameter of
good port State inspection quality.
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As stated earlier the IOMOU secretariat has prepared the draft manual and it was
submitted during the second meeting of the committee. After some debate it was
agreed that a task team be established, who will finalize the manual, which will be
submitted for approval during the third committee meeting. The task team would be
led by the Secretariat and would comprise a representative from Australia, Iran,
Mauritius and South Africa.
It was also agreed by the representatives of the member States to adopt the style of
manual as of the Paris MOU, they having an experience of 15 years. This manual
will be an effective tool for the port State control officers and will be guidance for
them, regarding the inspection and to have a harmonized system of conducting port
State control in the region.
The IOMOU has been granted a observer status in the Tokyo MOU, which will help
in having a closer relation ship between the two MOU’S. The IOMOU is still in the
infancy stage; the information system and web site is still to be installed, and
groundwork for the same is being done, to have it at the earliest.
Details of the IMO conventions ratified by the member States is listed in Annex-1.
Some of the States have not even ratified the important conventions dealing with the
safety and environment protection. For such States to implement the same on other
flagships visiting their ports, will not be possible.
The member States should first ensure that all the conventions especially required
for the control of vessels, are ratified and implemented in the national laws. They
should also take appropriate actions against ships flying its flag that fail to comply
with the applicable requirements.
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Chapter 3
Present Status of port State control in India
"Implementation, according to the dictionary, means putting something into effect. Making
sure that it gets done. And as far as IMO'S twin targets of Safer shipping and Cleaner
oceans are concerned, implementation is the key to success. It is a responsibility that no one
in shipping can evade"(Mr. William A. O' Neil).
3.1 Duties of Flag States
A convention before it becomes binding upon States, which have ratified, has to be
formally accepted by individual States. The adoption of a convention is only the first
step of a long process before the convention comes into force.
“If the State so fails to implement the convention, it is nevertheless
subject to it vis a vis other State parties, but it cannot enforce the
convention against them, unless that convention becomes part of
the law of the land by whatever legal process is applicable in that
State’s jurisdiction. The implementation of an international
convention to which a State has become a party is therefore an
essential step without which the State Party cannot benefit insofar
as the application of that law within its jurisdiction is concerned”
(Mukherjee).
Most of the States take a long time before the convention is implemented. As often-
national laws have to be enacted or changed to enforce the provision of the
convention, and in some cases, special facilities may have to be provided. For the
shipowner sometimes it involves huge amounts of money for the installation of new
equipment such as for example GMDSS. It is a time consuming process. Concerned
parties who are to be affected by the change like shipowners, shipbuilders and
others are to be informed, and sufficient time is to be given to them to act.
20
It is the duty of the flag State to implement the new regulations after they are ratified
and accepted and legislated in their national laws. Without the co-operation of the
flag States, it is next to impossible to implement the IMO Conventions. Thus
emerges the vital need for the assumption of regulatory responsibilities by the flag
States.
“The need for the shipping industry to learn from its mistakes has always been
recognized by IMO. The first convention to be adopted by IMO after it came into
being in 1959 was the 1960 version of SOLAS” (O’ Neil 1999a).
Substandard ships are not due to the lack of international standards, but due to the
lack of enforcement of existing standard. In signing major IMO conventions, a flag
State not only takes the responsibility for enforcing those aboard its ships, but also it
gets the authority to inspect the foreign vessels visiting its ports.
As stated by United Kingdom’s Minister of Shipping, “The IMO, the European
Commission and other responsible Administration do not believe that regulations
offers the best prospect of eliminating substandard ships”. Basically she said, there
are sufficient regulations but the challenge is to ensure the uniform application of
them uniformly (“Flag State responsibility--------“).
Regulation 21 of SOLAS Chapter 1 states "Each Administration undertakes to
conduct an investigation of any casualty occurring to any of its ships subject to the
provision of the present Convention when it judges that such an investigation may
assist in determining what changes in the present regulations might be desirable".
It is the duty of the flag States to conduct an enquiry and inform the cause of the
causalities to the IMO, so that if any regulations or amendments are to be made in
existing ones or any new regulations or amendments are to be made, action can be
initiated to avoid such recurrence. But in reality not many flag States inform the IMO,
about the findings of the investigation.
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The findings of the fire on board the Scandinavian Star in 1990, revealed many
factors, among which not all were covered by the regulations, but which were to a
large extent connected to qualifications, experience and attitudes towards the
operation of passenger ships. The official investigation carried out after the disaster
concluded that the following factors played a significant role (Christensen).
• the master had not taken the necessary action to train the crew in fire fighting
and evacuation, and the ship was not properly prepared for the intended service;
• the qualification of the crew with regard to safety were low;
• communication between the crew members was hindered by the lack of a
common language, and the sound level of the alarms and loudspeakers was low
and not able to warn the passengers of any danger;
• the arrangements of staircases and the corridors, where the cabins for
passengers were situated, was complicated,  making it difficult for the
passengers to find their way around the ship;
• the visual signposts were difficult to understand and located in non visual
positions, previous inspection of the ship failed to find certain faults; and
• the fire protection of the ship was not satisfactory, even if the present regulations
were complied with.
What we learn from the above report, is that having regulations is not sufficient. The
crew has to act at the time of emergencies, for which continuous training is required.
The flag State should ensure that all crews are well trained to act during
emergencies. Now through the ISM Code a lot can be achieved, if done in a proper
way and with a good intention. If only paper work is done to comply with the ISM
Code and to satisfy the Auditors, then the whole concept of ISM will be lost.
3.2 Flag State implementation and port State control
“IMO’s main objective is to have an effective, safe and healthy maritime transport
system. IMO certainly can have no objection to shipowners and shipping companies
making money and saving money-unless those savings are made at the expense of
safety or of the environment. If that happens then IMO is very concerned. Safety
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must be considered as an investment rather than as a cost factor to the industry,
because, undoubtedly, safety pays” (Plaza, 1999a).
For identifying the measures necessary to ensure effective and consistent global
implementation of IMO instruments, a new IMO Sub-Committee on Flag State
Implementation (FSI) was established in 1992.
The sub-committee was assigned the following terms of reference:
• to identify the range of the flag State obligations emanating from the IMO treaty
instruments;
• to assess the current level of implementation of IMO instruments by flag States;
• to identify those areas where flag States have difficulty in fully implementing IMO
instruments;
• to assess problems in the involvement of the States party to the IMO
instruments in their capacity as port States, Coastal States and countries
training and certifying officers and crews;
• to identify the reasons for the difficulties identified in the above two;
• to make proposals to assist parties;
• from its inception the FSI Sub-Committee dealt with a number of issues related
to port States responsibilities, resulting in the development of various guidelines
and recommendations, either adopted as resolutions or circulated by means of
MSC/MEPC or FSI circulars(Plaza ,1999a).
Some of the important / and /or recommended /instruments developed by the Sub-
Committee are listed below:
• guidelines for the authorization of organization acting on behalf of the
Administration;
• model agreement for the authorization of organization acting on behalf of the
Administration;
• guidelines to assist flag States in the implementation of IMO instruments,
• specifications for the survey and certification of functions of recognized
organizations;
• guidelines on the implementation of the ISM code by Administrations. Self-
assessment of flag State performance,
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• criteria for the self-assessment of flag state performance.
FSI sub-committee has laid down clear guidelines for various activities being carried
out by them. If it is followed the flag States should not have any difficulties in
implementing the conventions. But as seen the level of enforcement varies greatly
from Administration to Administration, which is one of the reason for having regional
MOU’s for port State control. Work of the FSI sub-committee on port State control
will be discussed in later Chapters.
It is sometimes argued that flag State control is being superseded by port State
control. Indeed it is sometimes argued that if the flag States won’t do the job the port
States must (Douglas).
But in reality it is confusing, as to how a flag State can carry out port State control
when the ships flying its flag are not up to the standard and being detained. How
can that flag State be relied on for the standard of inspection as port State.
As we see from the past maritime disasters starting from the Titanic to the Exxon
Valdez, new regulations were made to avoid reccurrence of such casualties. In 1967
the tanker Torrey Canyon ran aground off the West Coast of England, resulting in
the world's first major oil pollution. New conventions came after the disaster, as
there was a complete failure of measures to contain the spill and to clean up the
pollution that resulted and the amount of cost involved.
The most important initiatives by States and the IMO have been prompted by
disasters. The Torrey Canyon led to several conventions dealing with legal issues,
including liability and compensations. The most important convention was the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 1973. Later on a series of tanker
accidents off the coast of the United States led to the adoption of the 1978 Protocol
to MARPOL and to SOLAS.
When a disaster occurs, the shock is considerable and the public demands an
instant response. The Secretary General of IMO, Mr. William A. O' Neil, said in a
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speech to the general council of the Baltic and the International Council in May
1999, "public opinion forces governments into action and it is impossible to avoid
this reaction. How could the British or Swedish authorities hope to convince the
public that ro-ro’s were safe when the Herald of Free Enterprise and Estonia had
just sunk? How could the United States tell people that tankers were good for them
when their television screens were filled with images of the Exxon Valdez
surrounded by dead sea birds covered with oil"(O’ Neil, 1999a).
The most recent case of the last century, the tanker ‘Erika’ is an example. Post
mortem of the case is still going on, with each concerned party blaming the other.
 A statement from the chief executive of ABS is reproduced, which states as follows:
“When a vessel such as Erika is able to operate, it is a result of a cumulative failure
of the entire system. The disastrous consequences of that casualty rest with all
those who participated. If any one of those participants had raised objection to the
continued operation of the Erika, the vessel would have ended up in the scrap yard
where it obviously belonged” (“ABS proposes tougher--- “)
From the above statement it is quite clear, that somewhere in the line of operation,
there was a weak link, which allowed the continued operation of ships like Erika.
Even the port State control failed to stop the vessel from operation.
The compliance of IMO various Conventions and Protocols depends on the
implementation It is the responsibility of the flag States to legislate the various
treaties and conventions to which they are.party. Even most of the IMO conventions
are not ratified by the member States.
“Ratification involves both the privileges and obligation but before ratifying, a country
must be in a position to meet the requirements of the Convention as included in its
Articles and Regulations” (Cowleya). In practice it does not happen. It takes years by
some States to legislate them, and become effective. The main purpose of the
convention is lost if they are not implemented effectively. States who have not
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legislated cannot enforce them on their flags and foreign flags visiting their ports. In
other words they are not able to carry out port State control.
IMO only sets the standards, providing a basis for legislation, but cannot execute
legally binding forces of the convention on any party States. IMO has relied on the
flag Administrations who are members to provide domestic legislation and oversight
of the established requirements for vessels flying their flags as part of their duties.
Member States must incorporate the provisions of a convention into laws and
regulations. It is their role to play in implementing IMO standards and contribution in
eradicating substandard ships from their region.
Many States are not well equipped, they lack the necessary domestic legislation to
enforce the treaty. There are no trained surveyors to carry out inspections or
facilities to enable compliance with the regulations. In the opinion of the author the
lack of trained manpower and funds are the main reasons for not having an
established Maritime Administration in some of the States.
Flag States may delegate to classification societies, to carry out necessary
inspections and issuance of the statutory certificates, but as per SOLAS 74 as
amended, the responsibility lies with the flag States. Once the laws and regulations
are established, they must be enforced, and this is up to the individual flag States for
enforcing the same. Flag States and classification societies are expected to meet
certain basic criteria’s concerning their ability and commitment to comply with the
regulations in various conventions.
The present conventions, SOLAS, MARPOL, Load Line, STCW and others are the
accepted international minimum standards for maritime safety and pollution
prevention. In all these agreements, responsibilities for ships meeting these
standards lie primarily with the flag Administration for instance as stated in SOLAS
Article 1. In reality this responsibility is shared with the owners, classification
societies, charterers, and others all having a role to play.
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For safe manning of the ships, the flag States are to comply with the following
regulations.
1.The flag State is primarily responsible for setting and monitoring of safety
standards, as per IMO SOLAS Convention (1974) Chapter V, Regulation 13:
• the contracting governments undertake, each for its national ships, to maintain
or, if it is necessary, to adopt measures for the purpose of ensuring that, from
the point of view of safety of life at sea, all ships will be sufficiently and efficiently
manned;
• every ship to which Chapter 1 of this convention applies shall be provided with
an appropriate Safe manning document or equivalent, issued by the
Administration as evidence of the minimum safe manning considered necessary
to comply with, the provision of paragraph ‘a’ of regulation 13.
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: Article 94(3)(b) states
that every State shall take measures for ships flying its flag as are necessary to
ensure safety at sea with regard, to the manning of ships, to labour conditions and
the training of crews, taking into account the applicable international instruments.
3. ILO Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standard) Convention (1976): No.147, Article 2
(e) states that each member which ratifies this convention undertakes to ensure that
seafarers employed on ships registered in its territory are properly qualified or
trained for the duties for which they are engaged.
Further the role of the flag State is clearly defined, it states that flag States should
have laws or regulations for:
• safety standards, including standards for competency, hours of work and
manning;
• sound security measures;
• condition of employment and living arrangements.
The flag State is to ensure safety on board ships registered in its territory, and also
ensure adequate procedures for engagement of seafarers and investigation of
complaints:
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• on ships registered in its territory,
• by seafarers of its nationality employed on foreign ships.
The flag States have the ultimate responsibility for ensuring:
• living and working condition of seafarers.
• safe manning on ships registered with the flag;
• competence of its seafarers;
 For achieving the above, the following are essential pre-requisites:
• an adequate and competent Maritime Safety Administration ;
• international regulations included in the national legislation.
Many flag States lack the resources and /or expertise to fulfil the obligations, and
therefore delegate survey and inspection responsibilities to classification societies or
other organizations. Consequently some ships never see a flag State surveyor on
board. With such a scenario, in various maritime circles, one gets an impression that
port State control is the overall mechanism for ship safety and pollution prevention.
3.3 Genuine link concept in the 1982 UNCLOS
Registration is the administrative mechanism by which a State confers its nationality
upon a ship. The genuine link concept is referred to in article 91 (1) of UNCLOS in
the following words, "Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its
nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the rights to fly
its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State of whose flag they are entitled to fly.
There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship".
Article 94 of UNCLOS emphasizes that every State, apart from taking measures for
ensuring safety at sea for ships flying its flag with respect to construction, equipment
and seaworthiness must also maintain a register of ships containing the names and
particulars of ships flying its flag.
Article 211(2) of UNCLOS provides that States shall adopt laws and regulation for
pollution prevention of the marine environment from vessels flying their flag or of
their registry.
28
No longer, in most cases, does the nationality of a ship’s owner have anything to do
with the flag the ship flies. Most of the ocean going vessels owned by Americans is
registered abroad, in open registries, in places like Panama and Liberia (Morris).
Sometimes it even becomes difficult to trace the owner of a ship, in the case of
Erika, a French commission of inquiry into the sinking of the vessel has condemned
as “unacceptable" the opaqueness of the ownership of the tanker, admitting that it
had so far been unable to trace the ultimate owners. (Spurrier, 2000a).
The real owner, who is behind the scene, sometimes even goes scot-free after the
incident without being punished. It becomes difficult to fix responsibilities and claim
the compensation if the same is insufficient to meet the claim from the Oil Pollution
Compensation fund.
Numerous loop holes and weak links surface only after the major accident takes
place, and the concerned authority starts to react, so as to avoid more incidents of
the same nature. But the scrupulous operators find ways to keep their substandard
ships afloat. After the Erika incident the French transport minister stated that the
practice of chartering oil tankers under flags of convenience should be outlawed.
(Spurrier,2000b). Concerned parties responsible for the safety of the vessel viz. flag
States, port States, IACS and others, are now tightening all the loose ends.
Intertanko has launched an initiative of one on one meeting with flag States to stress
the need for improving quality. The exercise could in turn, see the creation of a
“preferred flag list” as a criterion for Intertanko membership (Joshi).
3.4 Open Registries
“Flag of convenience” has been designated in different terms signifying the attitude
of different national and social groups to what is thought to be the prevailing
characteristics of that system. They have been called at times " flags of necessity,
free flags, flags of opportunities, easy registry, safe harbours, etc. (Kasoulides).
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As the Rochdale report said in 1970, " it is not easy to provide a simple
definition of flag of convenience, which effectively encompasses their
significance and characteristics” The report defined such flags as follows:
• the country of registry allows ownership and/or control of its merchant vessels by
non-citizens;
• access to the registry is easy; a ship may usually be registered at a consulate;
• equally important, transfer from the registry at the owner’s option is not
restricted;
• taxes on the income from the ships are not levied locally, or are very low. A
registry fee and an annual fee, based on tonnage, are normally the only charges
made;
•  the country of registry has small power with no national requirements under any
foreseeable circumstances for all the shipping registered, but receipts from very
small charges on a large tonnage may however produce a substantial effect on
its national income and balance of payment,
• manning of ship by non-nationals is freely permitted;
• the country of registry has neither the power nor the Administration machinery to
impose any government or international regulation, nor has it the inclination to
control the shipping companies themselves (Kasoulides).
Open registries or flags of convenience account for almost 53 percent of the world
fleet by total dead weight tonnage for ships of 1000 gt. and over or a little over 40
percent of the world fleet by number of ships. Of this share, the five ‘majors’
Panama, Liberia, Malta, Bahamas and Cyprus account for about 83 percent
(Hawkins). Flags that dominate world shipping is detailed in Annex 2, among top
ten are major open registries.
What we observe from the table 3 A below is that most of the developed countries
shipowners are using flags of convenience for their ships. The reasons for this may
be as discussed earlier. At the same time we refer to the flags of convenience not
maintaining their standards? It is the shipowner who is responsible for maintaining
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his ship and some shipowners who only believe in trading substandard ships, make
use of these registries
Table 3 A: Top 10 users of open registries in 1999 (ships of 1000 gt and over)
Dwt Country of Percentage Share (DWT)
rank Domicile Panama Liberia Bahama
s
Other Major Flags Other
Flags
1 Greece 19.2 13.5 8.5 28.0 (Cyprus) 16.9
2 Japan 74.5 8.6 1.2 0.8 (Vanuatu) 14.9
3 US 7.1 33.6 17.0 26.8 (Marshall Is) 15.5
4 HK (SAR) 60.7 18.5 1.1 1.8 (Marshall Is) 17.9
5 Norway 5.9 28.7 32.0 17.9 (Malta) 15.5
6 Sweden 0.6 35.2 18.0 5.0 (Bermuda) 41.2
7 Korea 88.9 8.2 - 0.6 (St Vincent) 2.3
8 Germany 3.2 43.1 0.2 18.5 (Cyprus) 35.0
9 China 47.2 29.6 - 5.6 (St Vincent) 17.6





Flags of convenience, especially those that are not serious in complying with the
IMO conventions and without proper Administrations should not be encouraged by
shipowners who believe in standard ships. Then there will be fewer substandard
ships in the oceans
But slowly things are changing as the net of port State control is getting tighter. The
Maritime Administration of Honduras cancelled the registration of around 750
vessels deemed to be substandard in an effort to upgrade the ship register The
exercise was done to improve its image from one that tends to attract poor quality
ships. As per Dr Rivera, Director General, operation of open registers will be
increasingly restricted and regulatory pressures will reduce the number of such
flags. He added that the revenue generated from the fleet of 3,400 ships registered
in the country remained important (Grey).
If the attitude of the flag State is to make revenue out of registries, how can we
achieve quality shipping and safety of the seafarers and the environment? But days
are not far off when quality shipping will be the key word for a successful shipowner.
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As we see from the report, regarding a concept being born for creating a Global
Network of Quality shipping registers, which saw the first light of day at the Mare
Forum, 99 conference in Amsterdam. Mr. Nieuwport stated that “shipping is being
exposed to a two phased approach to quality and safety. One is punishment based,
with liability being handed on to the shipowner and this system being enforced by
port State control. Numerous rules and regulations, both national and international in
origin govern the other approach”. He further stated that ”there’s a scope for quality
registers and quality shipping companies to discuss how to create a new basis in the
market, a minimum foundation for safety and protection of the environment. Ships
and owners who qualify for these standards could be rewarded” (Insight).
On the other hand we see a report from the shipowners point of view. “The shipping
industry will suffer an increasingly tumultuous ride in the next century as growing
regulatory pressure and charter consolidation rocks the business”. This was the
resounding conclusion of a congregation of industry experts at the City of London
club (Smith).
No doubt the burden of the new regulations falls on the shipowner, in respect of cost
as well as human resource. Most of the shipping companies had to struggle till the
end to comply with the first phase of the ISM Code. Not all had experienced staff to
implement it, especially the smaller companies who had to depend on consultants.
 In the view of the author, the main reasons for the owners’ registering their ships in
safe havens is to avoid the strict imposition of regulations and taxes. Some flags of
convenience may not even have any expertise in Maritime Administration. The
operators find them much easy to deal with to get dispensations, and exemptions,
than they would have with established Administrations.
Panama became a flag State for hire in 1925 and has promoted itself since then. It
makes no secret of its eagerness to add ships to its already huge roster.
Regulations are easy; a shipowner can complete its necessary paperwork in a
couple of days, even hours, at one of its maritime consulates around the world
(Morris).
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How far the above statement is true, the author is not in a situation to comment on,
but, if the intention of the flag State is to generate revenue form registration of the
ships at the cost of compromising the safety standard, this should not be
encouraged at any cost. To inspect such vessels registered by the open registries
was also one of the causes for the birth of port State control so as to check
substandard ships from plying the seas.
 From table 3B below we observe that the number of ship losses has been on a
decreasing trend except in 1991. Strict enforcement of regulations will definitely
bring quality in shipping, but how long it will take to eradicate sub-standard ships is
to be seen? The attitude of shipowners operating these ships like Erika has to be
changed.
 
 TABLE 3B: Total reported losses, 1979-98 (ships of 500 gt and over)
 




 Total gt Lost
(000)
 Loss Ratio
 (as % of Total
gt)
 1979  280  23.3  2,282  0.20
 1980  229  19.0  1,785  0.33
 1981  249  20.7  1,711  0.41
 1982  236  19.6  1,460  0.25
 1983  210  17.5  1,352  0.15
 1984  214  17.8  1,283  0.29
 1985  188  15.6  1,282  0.32
 1986  156  13.0  1,207  0.31
 1987  139  11.5  1,179  0.30
 1988  147  12.2  776  0.20
 1989  156  13.0  1,078  0.27
 1990  147  12.2  1,382  0.33
 1991  173  14.4  1,752  0.41
 1992  134  11.1  1,097  0.25
 1993  121  10.0  652  0.15
 1994  122  10.1  1,421  0.31
 1995  114  9.5  767  0.17
 1996  113  9.4  701  0.15
 1997  89  7.4  739  0.15
 1998  80  6.6  519  0.10




Almost everybody agrees that substandard ships and their owners and operators
must not be allowed to continue in operation. It is those ships, which are targeted to
try to improve maritime safety, save lives and prevent pollution of the seas.
Port State control has produced results with substandard ships being detained by
various port State authorities until they meet international regulations. Flag States
that consistently fail to maintain internationally agreed minimum standards are
identified by effective port State control. It does not drive out these flag States nor
get rid of substandard vessels, these substandard ships are driven to the other
areas of the world where States are unable to carry out port State control due to
various reasons.
In order to get rid of all the substandard ships, what is required is interaction
between all regional MOU’S, exchange of information between them and a common
data base, to keep track of all the vessels moving from one region to the other.
3.5 Port State control in India
Port State control inspection was carried out if there were any complaints of
unseaworthiness of the ship or its equipment, by the crew or any other interested
party before 1990. So we can say that port State control existed in India but mostly
on complaint basis. Nowadays it is mandatory for a port State control officer to carry
out certain numbers of inspections every month.
A brief report on the development of port State control in India.
Due to the increase of workload resulting from amendments to various conventions
and introduction of new conventions, and limited number of surveyors not
commensurate with the growth in tonnage, port State control was not getting much
attention as flag State was fairly active on flag State implementation. Now port State
control has been taken up seriously, and much more is to be done, to reach the
target and to have an effective system to cover all the ports.
Most of the statutory work has been delegated to the leading classification societies
so that more time can be devoted to port State control so as to achieve the minimum
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target. Inspections of machinery and equipment are no more carried out by the
Administration surveyors. The surveyors of the Administration are still carrying out
inspections for issuance of Safety equipment certificate. General inspections are
also carried out during that time. If the ship is at foreign port the classification society
surveyors carry out the inspection for safety equipment.
The status of Indian Shipping in the international scene during 1992 was not very
encouraging. Under the Paris MOU India featured first in the 21 States selected for
priority inspection Indian ships detention percentage was 27.87 % as compared to
the world’s average of 5.62%. Appropriate measures were immediately introduced
by the Administration to improve the status of Indian shipping. Detained ship history
was probed. Deficiencies observed on ships were analyzed on quarterly and annual
basis and reports were circulated amongst shipowners and surveyors in field offices.
Meetings were held with the shipowners and classification societies whenever
necessary and fresh guidelines were issued to the Administration surveyors.
It was also observed that majority of the vessels detained were bulk carriers and
vessels on cross trade. It was not possible for Administration Surveyors to inspect
these vessels as they rarely called into Indian ports and conditions of the vessels
were not known. Renewal of statutory certificates for the vessels on cross trade
were carried out by classification societies on behalf of the Administration The trend
of deficiencies observed on board Indian flag vessels were similar to the trend world
over and detentions were fairly on genuine grounds. The trend of MOU’S had just
started, as such, standard of inspections were not uniform the world over and in
many States the port State control officers were not adequately qualified or trained.
Measures taken by the Administration did bring some desired effect in the standard
of vessels and the percentage of detention dropped as follows;
• Detention under Paris MOU steadily declined to 3.5% in the Year 1996.
• India is no longer on the priority list of Paris MOU.
• Under US Coast Guard Indian vessels detention % was only 0.26% over the
average detention % in 1996 (DGS).
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Table 3C: Details of Indian Vessels Detained by Various port State control Authorities
Year Total vessels
detained
Paris MOU Tokyo MOU USCG Others
1994 24 17 4 3 -
1995 21 8 8 5 -
1996 18 2 10 6 -
1997 16 7 3 4 2
1998 9 1 6 1 1
1999 19 11 4 3 1
Source: DGS
The reports received from the Paris MOU for 1997 were reflecting more on
operational deficiencies. This was brought to the notice of the masters of the ships
and the Administration also started interacting with senior officers of the ships
besides the shipowners.
More attention was paid to port State control as the effect of different MOU’s on port
State control on the Indian ports was felt. The number of substandard ships calling
at Indian ports increased, as it was difficult for such ships to operate in the other
regions due to effective port State control regime.
Table 3D: Port State and Flag State Inspections Details







1993 73 16 6 Nil
1994 107 56 28 Nil
1995 164 182 78 42
1996 171 178 136 75
1997 194 321 172 120
1998 235 545 236 183
1999 102 347 204 158
Source: D.G. Shipping.
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As observed from table 3D above, the total number of foreign flag vessels inspected
were 347 and the total number detained 158, which is around 45% of the total
number of inspections carried out. If there was no port State control, these
substandard vessels would have been operating with deficiencies; owners would not
have bothered to rectify them.
Hopefully with the Indian Ocean MOU in place the percentage may increase. The
Administration is taking steps to increase the number of qualified and trained
surveyors to increase port State inspection to at least 15%.
Table 3E: Flag of the vessels that had more numbers of detentions is listed:
Flag No. vessels
inspected





Bahamas 4 4 2 50
Belize 3 3 3 100
Cyprus 16 16 7 45
Honduras 2 2 1 50
Liberia 5 5 3 60
Malta 12 12 6 50
Panama 30 6 20
St. Vincent 40 40 27 67.5
Source: DGS
Apart from the above flags, ships of different flags were found deficient but their
percentage was much less then the flags detailed in the above table.
According to a news item in the UK P&I Club bulletin, authorities in Mumbai are
being very strict regarding substandard ships and taking their responsibilities for
implementation of port State control very seriously (UK P& I Club).
India has a vast coastline, with major ports located on the East and West Coast.
There are still some ports where Administration does not have a local office and the
surveyor has to travel a long distance to cover such ports. At such locations port
State control is still based on complaints. For instance the traffic in Gujarat State has
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increased tremendously, new ports have developed, tankers traffic has increased
due to new oil refineries. There are about 7 minor ports in the region, which require
more attention by port State control.
Being one of the oldest maritime States in the Indian Ocean India will have to play a
major role in eradicating substandard ships in the region. At the same time India
have to strengthen its flag State regime so as to maintain the requisite level of
standard on their ships.
India has ratified most of the major Conventions of IMO, as detailed in Annex 3.and
also of ILO. Most of the statutory work has been delegated to seven international
classification societies apart from the Indian register of shipping. The role of
classification society is very important in maintaining the standard of the ships. It
shall be discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Relevant IMO Conventions and role of classification societies in
port State control
“I would like to stress once again that we have already achieved a great deal. We can do
much more in the future and we can do it by concentrating not on new conventions, codes
and regulations but on people. The ISM Code will continue to make headway during the next
few years, bringing benefits even to those who doubted its value. The Changes made in the
1978 training Convention will greatly improve seafarer standards and assure that they are
highly trained professionals who possess the skills necessary to operate ships safely”
(William A O´Neil )
4.1 Origin of classification society
The origin of ship classification society can be traced back to 1760 as a body to
assess ships by classifying them in several grades:
• giving cargo owners information on the conditions of these ships;
• enabling them to determine if a specific ship is strong enough to carry their
cargoes, and, at the same time;
• giving underwriters important information enabling them to evaluate whether a
particular ship is eligible to be insured (Mitsuo).
Initially the role of the classification society was limited to the evaluation of the
condition of the ships as a third party. Later due to the development with more
modernized ships designed and constructed the role of the classification society
also changed. During 1882, a concept of freeboard of ships was established and
they were involved in assigning the freeboard to the ships. The classification
societies were recognized by the respective flag State as freeboard assigning
authorities once the requirements of freeboard became mandatory and part of
national maritime laws.
The International Regulations for the SOLAS and the International Regulations on
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Load Line were agreed upon in 1929 and in 1930 respectively which brought more
changes in the role of classification societies. Later the former regulation developed
into the International Convention for the SOLAS 1960 adopted at IMCO, which
required a Safety Construction certificate to be carried on board by the ships
engaged in international voyages.
More authorizations were granted to the classification society by the Administration
for issuance of statutory certificates, especially by those who had no established
system to survey and issue certificates. That was the beginning of the classification
society playing a major role, and then their activities expanded with each new set of
regulations like MARPOL etc., the latest being the ISM code.
No doubt classification societies have the expertise as their rules are developed and
updated on the experience gained from the ships they survey. It is an ongoing
process, which most of the national Administrations lack. The objective of this
chapter is not to compare the role of classification society and the Administration;
the author only wants to project the growth and importance of classification society.
Along with the growth, there are bound to be some drawbacks. More classification
societies entered into the lucrative business of classification, which resulted in
compromising safety standards. To avoid complying with all the regulations some
owners were looking for such classification societies.
To help such owners, there may be some classification societies to oblige them, but
definitely with their share, in a competitive market. There are quite a number of
parties involved in a substandard ship to sail, it is not only the shipowner.
If from the very beginning, the surveyors of the classification society are clear in
their minds that they are responsible for the seafarers life, the property and the
environment, as they are the one who is certifying the seaworthiness of the ship, I
am sure the numbers of such substandard ships will be reduced No classification
society should issue certificates to such substandard vessels. But in reality they do!
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The classification surveyors board the vessel at the request of the owner for a
particular inspection. In case he happens to observe something wrong in another
area onboard, he is not obliged to comment on that. Most of the time they also do
not report matters like that to the Administration, as such steps by the classification
society will not be favoured by the owner.
When most of the Statutory work is delegated to the classification societies by the
Administration, it is their responsibility to make sure that their surveyors are
complying with all instructions of the society and the national maritime
Administration, prior recommending for the issuance of the certificate.
4.2 IACS commitment
During a first conference of International classification societies way back in 1939, it
was agreed by the representatives of the of the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS),
Bureau Veritas (BV), Det Norske Veritas (DN), Germanischer Lloyds (GL), Lloyd’s
Register of Shipping (LR), Nippon Kaiji KyoKai (NK) and Registro Italiano Navale
(RINA) for developing co-operation between the classification societies.
The next conference was held in Paris in 1955 followed by several meetings. It was
during the Oslo conference in 1968 that the establishment of International
Association of the Classification Societies was agreed upon.
The aim of IACS agreed upon by all members was:
• to promote the improvement of standards of safety at sea and prevention of
pollution of  the marine environment;
• to consult and cooperate with relevant international and maritime organization;
• to maintain close co-operation with the world’s maritime industry.
As back as in 1992, IACS submitted the following statement to the IMO at the 61st
session of the Maritime Committee;
“The International Association of the Classification Societies (IACS) wishes to inform
IMO member States that its member societies have agreed to common procedures
with respect to their co-operation with port States in the context of port State
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inspections. A member society will attend on board a vessel classed by that society
when so requested by a port State in order to facilitate the rectification of reported
deficiencies or other discrepancies. The individual IACS member society concerned
will, where appropriate, duly notify the vessels flag State and owners of such
attendance and will fully co-operate with the port State in the ratification of any such
safety related matter of either classification or statutory nature within its purview or
authority delegated to it” (Reilly).
In short IACS has done the following for port State control:
• provided training assistance, especially in the vital link between IMO
Conventions and class rules;
• made data available on class transfer; established databases on port State
control detentions
• actively co-operated with IMO and newly developed MOU’s;
• maintained dialogue with MOU Secretariats (IACS briefing No.6 March 1998).
Port State control can only be successful if the officers carrying out inspections are
well versed with the IMO conventions and the classification societies technical rules.
The rules of the leading classification societies provide a common reference point
and IACS and its members are ready to assist in meeting the training needs of port
State control organizations.
On the invitation of MOU’s, IACS has provided training support to the Paris and
Tokyo MOU’s on port State control, and in future may provide to Caribbean and
Mediterranean counterparts To improve international maritime safety, IACS is
committed to full co-operation and information exchange with port State control
(IACS briefing 2, July 1996).
The IACS program of seven key Maritime Safety Initiatives was formally
implemented on 1 January 1996, which focussed to restrict the operation of shipping
that fails to comply with the standards set by IACS members. The program includes:
• greater transparency of Class and Statutory information and automatic
suspension of Class under specified circumstances ;
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• tightening of the Transfer of Class agreement;
• qualification /certification and training of surveyors;
• relations with port State control.
The procedure for responding to port State control defines the co-operation and
assistance to be given by surveyors during port State control inspections, including
prompt and positive response to a port State request for a surveyor to attend on
board. The brief summary of procedures responding to port State control, by IACS
members and associates are listed in Annex 4 (IACS briefing 2, July 1996).
From the above we see that there is a willingness on the part of the classification
societies to co-operate with the port States, when notified. Classification societies
are expected to assess the situation, provide advice and guidance and, when
appropriate, make recommendations. The role of the classification society depends
largely on flag States, as they are the ones who are delegating the authority to the
classification societies. If the flag States have machinery to monitor the classification
societies, the problem of substandard ships can be dealt with to some extent.
There are instances during the lifetime of a vessel, that change of classification
societies might take place from one society to another. There may be many
legitimate reasons, including a change in ownership, flag, underwriter or trading
pattern etc. Also, instances where a vessel owner might consider changing society
to avoid dealing with outstanding recommendations made by the existing
classification society.
To keep a check on such transfers, IACS members have adopted a transfer of
classification agreement and have established a database tracking each
administrative and technical step in such transactions. These steps will safeguard
the system to prevent a vessel from effectively changing classification society
without satisfactorily dealing with all outstanding recommendations.
Recognizing this interest, IACS members have agreed to share the data with
legitimate groups, including port States and underwriters (Reilly). But in reality it
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does not always happen, as we have learnt from the recent Erika disaster. The
objective of IACS is not realized, if one member of IACS is not committed in
following the guidelines. What happens after an incident is criticized by all affected
parties and in case of oil spills by the public and press also.
After the Erika incident, in shipping press, the oil companies appear to be criticizing
each other for inefficient safety policies, while the classification societies, which
have the responsibility of inspecting all ships, are also breaking ranks (Carlsson).
With the aim of tightening the safety net particularly for older tankers, IACS held an
extraordinary council meeting on 16th February 2000 in the wake of the Erika
accident. The Council decided to strengthen self-policing in various respects:
• vertical contract audits of old ships having changed class will be performed
within the next few months;
• vertical audits will start on 10 RINA ships including the Erika. The history of Erika
will be investigated for the past two years.
A number of significant decisions strengthening survey procedures were taken
including:
• internal examination of all ballast tanks adjacent to cargo tanks with heating coils
of ships of 15 years and more on an annual basis ;
• for tankers and bulk carriers of 15 years and older intermediate surveys will be
enhanced to the scope of a special hull survey, with the exception of the dry-
docking requirements
• an exclusive surveyor will monitor thickness measurements more closely
(IACS press release, 2000, Feb.17).
How many more such accidents are required to eradicate substandard ships from
operations? The question that comes to everybody’s mind and the answer is not
easy. Days are not far off when apart from targeting substandard ships we will have
to identify substandard classification societies or substandard shipowners or may be
even Administrations. A white list of Administrations, classification societies,
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shipowners and others as in the case of STCW Convention may be seen in the
future.
Recently another bulk carrier, Leader L sank. Eighteen crewmembers lost their life.
It appears that Leader L had nine conditions of class, many of them related to
corrosion, imposed during an abortive special survey in February 1997, by Lloyd’s
Register. However, the owner transferred the Class to Poliski Regestr Statkow,
before the survey was completed. The transfer of class took place in May 1997.
Problems included wastage on main frames, lower frames brackets and topside tank
web frame faceplates (Osler, 2000a). All parties concerned have started
investigations. Whatever may be the result of the enquiry, lives have been lost.
Leader L may not be the last one, more may follow, if the attitudes of the concerned
persons are not going to change.
4.3 Duties of classification societies
Classification societies play a very important role in ensuring the safety of ships and
the protection of the environment. They are involved with the design and inspection
of the ships during and after construction. The surveys are conducted according to
the society rules that have been established partly on the basis of extensive
expertise and partly through research. Classification societies are better placed then
most of the Administrations around the world, as they have the requisite manpower
and expertise compared to the Administrations.
But sometimes due to the owner’s operational commitment, classification societies
do tend to look the other way. It has been observed from port State control reports
that, inspite of valid statutory certificates issued by the classification societies, the
ships are being detained all over, because they are found to be unseaworthy for the
proposed voyage. The days are not far off when the owner himself will ask the
classification society as to how his ship is detained when the vessel was issued with
a certificate.
As per Regulation I/6 of the SOLAS Convention and Regulation 4 of Annex 1 and
Regulation 10 of Annex II of MARPOL 73/78, the Administration may entrust the
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inspections and surveys to nominated surveyors or recognized organizations. The
recognized organizations are mainly the classification societies, which may or may
not be members of IACS.
In view of the above, most of the Administrations around the world delegate some
function or all, depending on the resources available to them, to carry out the
statutory work on their behalf. At the same time Administrations are required to keep
a close watch on the function of the classification societies, as the ultimate
responsibility lies with the Administration.
Reasons for delegation to the classification societies are mainly:
• classification societies are in the field since the last two centuries;
• have adequate rules and regulations, required for the construction of the vessel;
• have a global network and offices all around the world and surveyors, if not, they
appoint exclusive surveyors;
• surveyors are trained for various types of vessels;
• as they are independent bodies, recruitment of surveyors is not difficult in case
more manpower is required;
• administration, who has to survey only small fleet of vessels, having a full
establishment, is a burden on the exchequer.
IMO desires to develop uniform procedures and a mechanism for the delegation of
authority, and a minimum standard for recognized organizations acting on behalf of
the Administration, which would assist flag States in the uniform and effective
implementation of the relevant IMO conventions and hence adopted:
• Resolution A.739 (18) regarding guidelines for the Authorization of organization
acting on behalf of the Administration
• Resolution A.789 (19) regarding detailed specifications on the precise survey
and certification functions of recognized organizations.
In the view of this author it appears that, as more and more flags of convenience
entered the global scene to increase their revenues out of registration fees, without
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any Maritime Administration in place, very many statutory inspections and surveys
were delegated to classification societies.
Some of these classification societies did not have much experience. The end result
was sub-standard ships sailing all over. Not even the competency of the seafarer
was to the required standard. Now, with the IMO guidelines and specification, the
harmonization of standards of different classification societies is expected.
However, even if the results of the periodic surveys are satisfactory, proper ship
maintenance between surveys is necessary to keep a ship in a well-maintained
condition. The responsibility of maintenance lies with the shipowner and the ship
staff. The clause in the statutory certificates issued by the classification society often
states that at the time of the inspection the relevant things were found satisfactory.
One case can be that during inspection the lifeboats were lowered and found to be
satisfactory. But due to negligence of the ship staff, no regular maintenance routine
was carried out. The lifeboat lowering mechanism was seized with corrosion in
course of time, and lifeboats could not be lowered during emergency. Now the
question arises. Who should be responsible? Should the surveyor of the
classification society or of the flag State who carried out the survey be responsible?
The answer is no. Why should a surveyor be blamed for the incompetence of the
ship staff?
The answer to such incidents is port State control inspection or the unscheduled
inspection by the flag State. But it is not possible in all cases for the flag State to
carry out unscheduled inspections. Most of the ships may not call the ports, where
flag State surveyors are available. To take care of such ships, port State control
inspections help to ascertain ship maintenance between the classification
/Administration survey. It keeps the ship staff alert.
Some of the States have delegated most of the Statutory surveys to the
classification societies. As far as the author knows, there is no unscheduled
inspections carried out by the classification societies. Classification societies will
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have a continuing role to play in the future, to co-operate with each other, flag States
and port States.
No doubt, once the vessel has been identified by port State control as having
detainable deficiencies and is detained, the classification society is informed. They
do board a vessel to facilitate the correction of the reported deficiencies. All major
classification societies follow a common procedure during intervention.
But, why should there be a need for a third party like port State control to do the
policing job? It can be justified if the deficiencies were found, say after 6 months of
certification. Sometimes, ships can also be found with major deficiencies, even after
a short period of time after being issued with statutory certificates.
Who is responsible for this? The shipowner, classification society, flag State or no
one? The answer, in view of the author, is that all are responsible to some extent. If
the shipowner decides to keep his vessel in satisfactory condition, there is nobody to
stop him doing so. The flag States must be monitoring what has been delegated and
take strict action, if found not to be complying, to the extent of withdrawing the
delegation of authority. But flag States need to have machinery and the will to do so,
which many unfortunately lack.
Being the world’s largest register, Panama’s maritime authority will begin an audit of
class societies. This will squeeze out the substandard operators and may be
substandard classification societies, which will remain. The Chief of the Panama
register further stated that certain societies were suspected of giving certificates to
“rust buckets”; some were said to be among the more reputable names in the
industry. He said that if the societies failed to pass the audit, they would be retired
from the list of companies, which could work with the Panamanian registry (Stares).
The author feels that inspections, finding deficiencies and detaining vessels are not
the only answer on how to eradicate substandard ships. It does help in identifying
substandard ships but the issuing authority should be held responsible, if it is found
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that present deficiencies were also there during the initial inspection. Each serious
case should be dealt with separately, and who will be responsible for this?
To answer the above, what we need is a Global harmonization of port State control.
This will be discussed in later chapters.
After the Erika disaster, the standard of classification society has been again
questioned. RINA came under intense scrutiny. port State control authorities
detained two vessels classed with RINA with serious deficiencies. The Paris MOU
nominated one of the vessels classed by RINA as February 2000 “rust bucket of the
month” with a long list of deficiencies (Osler, 2000b)
It is interesting to note here is that one of the vessel’s class and statutory certificates
was withdrawn following annual survey on 18th February 2000 by RINA. If the Erika
incident had not happened, may be she would have not been orphaned. How the
vessel was put up for annual survey when she had a number of serious deficiencies
is anybody’s guess? Going by the list of deficiencies pointed out by the port State,
for example, emergency fire pump inoperative, life boat engine inoperative, life boat
equipment not properly maintained, doubler plates on the collision bulkhead, there
were indications of a structural problem, and many more.
The question many may ask is why were these vessels not targeted before the Erika
disaster. Does port State control also have to wait for some disaster to happen?
What happens after the disaster is well known. There is criticism for all concerned
parties. Is it that port State control is also becoming another routine matter? To fulfil
the target of the number of ships inspected annually to comply with the minimum
requirement of MOU. How serious the members of the Memorandum are in carrying
out port State control is difficult to judge.
No doubt there is lot a of paper work involved, once the vessel is detained, and also
threats of penalty to be paid if unduly detained. These factors are always behind the
mind of the port State control officer. Given a choice he would rather inspect a new
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vessel than board a rust bucket and thus create a lot of work for himself. It may not
be always like this, but exceptional cases are always there.
The major Classification society data on their share of tonnage are as follows:
• Lloyd’s Register has 102.5m gt. in class, representing about 19% of the world
fleet.
• Class NK has 107mgt in class, representing about 20% of the fleet (6,591)
vessels.
• Bureau Veritas has 34.8-m gt. in class representing about 6.4 % of the fleet
(6,350) vessels.
• American Bureau of Shipping has 103.2.4m gt. in class representing about 16%
of the commercial fleet (11,261) vessels. This also includes many non-
commercial vessels.
(Osler, 2000c)
Statistics for the port State control available from the annual report of Tokyo MOU
for the year 1997 and 1998 appended in Annex 5. The deficiencies and detention
per classification society, is summed up as follows:
Table 4A: Tokyo MOU detention s as per classification societies










1997 12,957 58 6.3 Panama
Register Corp.
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Source: Tokyo MOU annual report 1998
The percentage of ships with deficiencies is very high, in both years more then 50
%. But the detention percentage is 6 to 7 %. Even these ships if allowed to sail
without rectification of deficiencies could have posed a threat to life and
environment. Sometimes even small deficiencies pertaining to safety can be
dangerous. We can come to the conclusion that port State control is contributing in
ensuring that the ships which go to high seas are safe.
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4.4 Consequences of accident on classification society
Tanker accident tops the headlines in media. When hundred die in some other
accident, it is short-lived news. When a bulk carrier sinks with crew, it is again a few
days news. But a tanker accident goes on for months. Pictures of oil damped birds
and seals are shown day after day. Suddenly everybody in the authority realizes that
some rules should be changed. Suggestions like banning the single hull tankers
from plying in their region are heard. Is this the way a society should work? With the
modern technology these days available, we should not react to one incident only.
Meanwhile, every State authority seems to believe that shipping will be safe only if
their own flag flies onboard and if there is an age restriction on ships (Carlsson).
Now the question being debated is weather the age of ships is related to accidents.
In the opinion of the author it is the maintenance of the vessel, which is more
important than the age. If age is to be the deciding factor for scrapping the ship,
what age is to be fixed?
Erika was one of the eight sister ships built between 1974 and 1976. Three of which
are reported to have suffered significant structural damage in the past ten years.
Japanese and China classification societies are investigating the surviving vessels,
meaning they were “bad” already from the beginning before you could say they were
old ships (The sea, 2000a).
RINA the Italian society that classed the ship maintains that it carried out its duties
fully. However, it has come under pressure over claims that corrosion was
discovered in ballast tanks some weeks before sinking (the sea, 2000b).
It appears that even the sister ships of the Erika were involved in two oil spills in a
four-month period in 1993. One of those vessels has changed name and flag
several times. The class report shows a clear history of deck buckling and cracking.
Also the tendency for the longitudinal to detach way back in 1986 (Osler, 2000d).
The reactions after the Erika incident is listed below:
• More in depth investigation of the sister ship of Erika which was involved in two
spills in 1993. The vessel in question flies the Turkish flag, and changed hands
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several times and has a history of detachment of deck longitudinal way back in
1986 and 1991 (Osler, 2000d).
• A proposal to tighten classification society scrutiny of aging vessels, particularly
tankers was unveiled by Iarossi, Chairman of ABS. Same will be dealt
separately (MacLaughlin).
• Decision being taken as to how to rid Europe of single hull tankers and tougher
controls when vessels from whatever flag visit European port, as well as tougher
technical inspections by classification societies. port State control directives
would be updated to make inspection obligatory on tankers less than 20 years
(Gray, 2000a).
• France went on the offensive against polluters. Speaking to volunteers who were
cleaning the oil spill from tanker Erica French President was of the view that
polluters pay more for damage caused by oil slicks. He stated that “It is no
longer acceptable that the community bears the brunt of damage caused by the
rampant pursuit of profit” (Spurrier, 2000c).
• Intertanko went to the extreme of threat to shun classification society by stating
that some of the world’s leading classification societies may be ostracized by
Intertanko in the wake of the Erika catastrophe off the coast of France. The
alternative is to reduce to fewer acceptable societies (Gray, 2000b).
• Trading opportunities for older tankers are becoming scarce as oil companies
tighten their chartering policies in the wake of the Erika disaster. In view of the
disaster the French government has put pressure on domestic Oil Companies
not to employ tankers in excess of 15 years of age and use only the national flag
(Gray, 2000c).
• The European transport commission proposed the early phase out of single hull
oil tankers as part of the post Erika maritime safety package. (Gray, 2000d).
• The European transport Commissioner further said, “This proposal is balanced
and places us in a position equivalent to the US. Without it, less performing
ships would be concentrated in European waters”. An opportunity to legislate
after the breaking of Erika must be seized (Gray, 2000d ).
It appears that the authority was waiting for some disaster to happen, to make rules
more stringent. What will happen if a tanker less than 15 years also spills oil?
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The above proposal was not taken well by the industry, as we see from the
statement by Intertanko managing director, “session on classification society and
port State control resulted in a very creative and positive discussions on how to
improve matters. However, he was frustrated by the session on single hull tankers.
They did not see it as a technical issue, but a political issue” (Gray, 2000d).
Most of the actions quoted above could and should have been taken, before the
Erika disaster occurred. Why wait for some disaster to happen? Why did the
classification society issued statutory certificates to Erika? Why did the Oil Company
charter the vessel? These are the questions to be answered. But now it is too late.
The damage has been already done. Maybe with these new prescriptions, operators
of substandard ships will now shift their operation to some other part of the World.
During the last three years Erika was inspected seven times by different port State
control authorities, the last one carried out was in November 1999. All authorities
who inspected the vessel are members of the Paris MOU. The list of deficiencies
issued during the last port State control does not show any major deficiency. They
were mainly pertaining to life saving equipment and freeboard marks.
During port State inspection it may not be possible to determine the actual condition
of the vessel structure, especially if the vessel is an oil tanker, chemical or gas
carrier. Even in a general cargo ship it is difficult for the port State control officer to
inspect the structural condition. Sometimes such vessels are well maintained from
outside like cosmetics, mainly to mislead the port State control officer.
Erika, a 25 year old tanker will be remembered in the maritime history at par with
Amoco Cadiz and Exxon Valdez. As we see from the report of the European
commission it has proposed radical measures to prevent oil pollution disaster on
European coastlines. The European Commission made another fundamental step
towards the enhancement of maritime safety in the community waters through the
adoption of a communication on the safety of the sea-borne oil-trade, adopted on
21st March 2000. The proposal will strengthen the existing EU legislation on port
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State control and classification societies, but will also phase out oil tankers with a
single hull in EU waters.
The Commission has therefore proposed a series of immediate and long-term
actions so as to avoid recurrence of ERICA type casualties:
• control of ships visiting Community ports should be reinforced and ships not
meeting the norms should be dealt with severely;
• if the ships over 15 years of age have been detained by port State control
authorities more than twice in the previous two years proposal to ban them from
all Community ports, will publish a black list every six months;
• inspection of ballast tanks for older ships, to be included by port State controls
and ships should be required to report certain data before entering a port so that
inspections can be properly prepared;
• the Commission may seek to suspend or revoke the authority of societies if
found negligent;
• transfer of the complete history file when a ship changes class to the new
classification society and obligation to follow certain procedures.
(European Commission News release)
There were reactions from the shipping industry, regarding the proposal of the
Commission, such as from the Spanish shipowner’s association, “the rigid
enforcement of the Commission’s proposals on stricter vessels inspection and
classification society would suffice and reduce the number of substandard ships,
irrespective of origin or age, sailing in European water” (Reyes, 2000a).
In general oil tankers are inspected by their owners, operators, flag State, port State,
classification societies, charterers before chartering a vessel, insurers, port
authorities and others. The list is growing, especially after each tanker accident’s
parties concerned lose confidence in owners, flag States and classification societies.
The statement from one of the leading classification society is worth mentioning.
“This is not a mystery,” said Iarossi. “It is quite clear that the Erika sank as a result of
structural failure, with disastrous results. Although ABS was not directly involved in
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this casualty, the loss of the vessel and the devastation of the marine environment
should be of great concern to every responsible member of the marine community.”
“I make no apologies for any failure of class in this case,” Iarossi stressed.
“Apologies will not help. Rather we all need to rationally search for meaningful
improvements in the safety infrastructure”.
“The entire marine industry has accepted the substandard for far too long”, he
insisted. “Substandard ships continue in service because there are substandard
owners willing to operate them. They are supported by substandard flag States
eager to register them, substandard charterers prepared to hire them and
substandard class societies that will turn a blind eye to the shortcomings, while port
States have become overburdened in their attempts to act as the policemen of the
maritime world. In addition, there are still insurers and financial institutions prepared
to underwrite them”. Class needs to immediately impose the following requirements
like limit class transfer of vessels 15 years of age or older to a window of six months
following the Special Survey completion date unless an equivalent survey is
conducted at the time of transfer. Details in Annex 6 (ABS press release, 00,
Feb.4).
Even the IMO Secretary General in his speech at the Hong Kong Shipowners
Association luncheon stated “ I think that concern over the Erika incident has been
increased by the fact that the system of controls and inspections that was designed
to ensure that any defects were detected quite clearly failed. The Erika was under
the class and had been inspected by port State control and industry inspectors
several times, yet none of these surveys showed that the ship was about to split in
two. We are all bound to ask why not? (O’ Neil, 2000b).
In the opinion of the prominent US tanker operator, there is something
fundamentally wrong when tankers need to be inspected by classification, insurance
underwriters, flag and port State and oil major companies. If new procedures could
eliminate all these inspection, safety would be improved. To achieve this he said
that:
• the number of classification societies should be slashed to not more than three;
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• have class standards set up by an international body under IMO;
• have class societies paid through flag of registry and not the owners;
• have competition between classification societies eliminated.
The Erika disaster had catalyzed opinion towards the tanker industry. “The Erika
which was an unfortunate serious environmental tragedy, has become the wake-up
call that the tanker’s industry needed” (Bray).
What happened to the Sleipner Ferry tragedy is well known and will not be
discussed in detail. The author only wants to bring the sad part of the whole tragedy
to limelight. Life saving appliances provided on board for the safety of passengers
and crew appears to have failed. The whole exercise of carrying out inspection by
flag State, port State and others have no meaning, if the equipment is faulty.
During the annual safety equipment survey, the maximum what is tried out is
lowering of the lifeboats, and donning of life jackets. Now if the lifejackets are faulty
at the design stage it is very unfortunate. No surveyor no matter what experience he
has can judge that during annual inspections.
The report of the UK Maritime & Coast guard Agency (MCA), who carried out the
tests of the lifejackets after the incident, revealed several shortcomings in the design
including:
• difficulty in donning the life jackets without instruction;
• serious concerns about the ability of the life jacket to turn around an
unconscious casualty lying face down in the water;
• the lifejacket’s ability to achieve the maximum mouth clearance above the water
surface. (“When type ---“, Fairplay).
4.5 Relevant IMO Conventions
As far as classification societies are concerned, they don’t have to deal directly with
all the IMO conventions. For example with respect to STCW, the classification
society may be involved indirectly for issuance of the Quality system certificate for
the training institute. The main Conventions they deal with are pertaining to
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Construction, Load Line and MARPOL, to the extent applicable to ships only. The
other parts of MARPOL such as reception facilities and pollution control are being
dealt with mostly by the Administration.
Most of the States have delegated statutory surveys to the classification societies
depending on the manpower available to them, however:
• some Administrations carry out the safety equipment survey themselves, and
survey for issuance of SAFCON, Load Line and IOPP is done by the
classification societies.
• others have delegated all statutory surveys and issuance of the full term
certificate, and some even ILO matters.
In the view of this author, if the surveyors of the Administration are carrying out port
State control, they need some experience of flag State survey. Seminars and
workshops are not sufficient to give all the practical knowledge they may require. In
view of this, the Administration should at least develop its own team of surveyors to
carry out surveys pertaining to safety equipment.
In doing so, flag State surveyors will be boarding a vessel at least once a year, and
at that time they can also carry out a general inspection. The way the classification
society works can also be monitored.
Due to the role the classification society has to play, comes in for a lot of criticism
after each marine causality. The fingers are pointed at them. The cause of the
casualty may or may not be linked to the classification society certification.
Class plays a central role in the safety of the ship. Recognizing this, the 1st July
1998 revision to SOLAS 74, on “Recognized Organizations” requires “ships to be
designed, constructed and maintained in compliance with the structural, mechanical
and electrical requirements of a classification society, recognized by the
Administration, or with applicable national standards of the Administration which
provide an equivalent level of safety”.
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4.6 Effect of ISM on port State control
“Of all the new initiatives introduced within the maritime industry in recent times, the
ISM Code represents one of the most significant far-reaching changes. Indeed,
some industry participants believe that the ISM Code is the biggest change since
the SOLAS convention, which was first introduced after the Titanic sank” (Hawkins).
Quality is becoming the key word in all aspects of life including maritime industry .to
have a safer, efficient and competitive maritime sector. Human error in ship
operation has long been debated, and it was observed that 80% of accidents take
place due to human operational error.
Reasons for human errors in ship’s operation are numerous:
• fatigue, due to reduction of manning, and short port stay;
• stress, due to long stay on board, and noise;
• poor qualification of seafarer, lack of adequate training institution and also not to
the required standard;
• multinational crew resulting in language and culture differences;
• negligence;
• living and working condition;
• sometimes even the attitude of senior officers;
• away from family for a long period.
To minimize the scope for poor human decisions, which contributes, directly or
indirectly to a casualty or pollution incident on ships, the ISM Code evolved.
Having realized the highest potential for improvement on the management and
operational side the IMO developed and adopted Resolution A. 647(16) “IMO
Guidelines on Management for the safe operation of ships and for pollution
prevention” at its 16th Assembly. The succeeding Resolution A. 680(17). was
adopted in November 1991. Further in November, 1993, at its 18th assembly the
ISM Code for the safe operation of the ships and for the pollution prevention was
adopted vide Resolution A. 741(18) and in May 1994 it was made mandatory as
Chapter IX of the SOLAS Convention, which came into force from 1st July 1998
depending on type and tonnage of the ship. In November 1995 Guidelines on
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implementation of the ISM was adopted as Resolution A.788(19) at its 19th
Assembly.
The ISM code introduces proactive approaches to compliance and to the prevention
of accidents before they occur. It develops a procedure that goes beyond the
practice of correction of defects only when deemed necessary.
The preamble to the ISM Code states that the cornerstone of good safety
management is commitment from the top level. In matters of safety and pollution
prevention it is the commitment, competence, attitudes and motivation of individuals
at all levels that determines the end result.
4.6.1 Purpose of the code:
The principle purpose of the Code is to provide an international standard for the safe
management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention. The purpose is
directed towards:
• establishment of safe practices in ships operation and a safe working
environment;
• the prevention of injury and loss of life;
• the scope of the relevant IMO and ILO Convention has now been effectively
expanded to address also the human element.
The success of the ISM code will only be felt when all responsible for operation of
the ships implement the same. Section 1.4 of the Code states that every company
should develop, implement and maintain a safety management system (SMS) which
includes the following functional requirements:
• a safety and environmental protection policy;
• instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and protection of
the environment in compliance with relevant international and flag State
legislation;
• defined levels of authority and lines of communication between, and amongst,
shore and shipboard personnel;
• procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities.
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• procedures to prepare for and respond to the emergency situations; and
• procedures for internal audits and management reviews.
As stated by ABS President, ISM offers a chance for self-regulation, rather than
prescription. He further states that “the code itself may be a regulatory requirement,
but it does not, and will not establish or result in a clearly defined set of regulation
standards applicable to all operations. Unlike every other safety standard imposed
upon the industry, the ISM Code does not set clear yes or no, conformance or non-
conformance, criteria” (Osler, 1999e).
The weaknesses in the Code according to him can be summed up as follows:
• lack of uniformity of interpretation by the world’s various port State control
authorities;
• some flag States are willing to accept audits by organization that do not appear
to have appropriate experience or resolves or even continues to consider ISM
certification withdrawn by the audit body as still valid.
Some company’s hastily developed ISM procedure manuals that were even more
hastily imposed upon the staff as the deadline for ISM certification approached.
There have been instances when the Shipboard manuals were provided to the ship
staff, just a day prior to the audit. Very few officers may have been honest enough to
tell the auditor the facts. It was for the auditor to judge the situation and act.
Speaking on the practical impact of the International Management code since its
introduction in July 1998, the safety system manager for Bureau Veritas (BV) said
that it “had a positive impact but, inevitably, dishonest owners and operators had
managed to locate yawning loopholes in the system”. One of the short cuts being
used by the shipowners was the use of interim certificates, which could be issued if
there is evidence that they planned to implement a system. Even shopping around
for a favorable certification from a class society was observed. Competition among
societies by reducing the tariffs and fees for ISM certification had become huge and
fierce (“Competing societies-----“).
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As per the US Coast Guard Captain Tom Gilmous, “the ISM code has improved
matters. But it has not changed the relative (safety) ranking of the shipping
companies or classification societies”. The Coast Guard has so far detained twenty-
five ships having valid ISM certificate for ISM related deficiencies and ordered seven
out of US waters. This shows the different standard of ISM certification and the way
they were obtained.(Competing societies’-----“).
During the extraordinary Council meeting held on 16th February, 00 in the wake of
Erika accident IACS Chairman Hans Payer stated that “IACS is declaring war on
substandard ships” (IACS, 17th Feb. press release). If the owners and managers of
Erika had properly implemented the ISM Code the accident would have been most
unlikely. It appears that Erika on paper was perfectly satisfactory. Causality of Erika
has proved that just ISM documentation on board is not sufficient to avoid accidents.
Paper is not enough to hold ships together, or to keep the water out. The ship’s
most probable destination would have been the scrap yard, rather than the floor of
the Atlantic if the system of survey and inspection was followed (Leader).
A leading international ship manager commented on the effectiveness of the ISM
code in fighting substandard shipping. He said, “Given that the Code was meant to
put the substandard operation out of business. I see very little evidence of that
happening”. He further stated that, “indeed I am yet to meet or hear of anyone that
has failed to have gained accreditation”. According to him some sub-standard
operators are using professional crews that move from one ship to another as the
ISM, SMC becomes due for audit or renewal (Bossen, 1999a).
What we gather from the views of the owner, manager, classification and the port
state on ISM, are that the audits were not carried out as they should have been by
the Auditors. But at the same time we cannot come to the conclusion that there was
no effect of ISM on safety. There has been an improvement in the safety culture, at
least now apart from the officers the crew also knows something about safety. It
may take some time to see the result. At the same time auditors should be stricter
while carrying out interim audits. As around more then two years would have passed
since the implementation of SMC on board ship.
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For more effective ISM Code implementation, there should be:
• no competition among the classification societies;
• better trained Auditors;
• better training provision for seafarer and shore based personnel,
• administrations should have greater control over the implementation process
through more rigorous ISM  audits and port State control inspections Most of the
administrations have authorized the classification societies to carry out the audit
and the issuance of the relevant certificate.
.
Changes in individual attitude and  behavior is required for an improvement in safety
culture. This can be done in three stages.
• development of greater awareness;
• specification of desired behavior;
• practice of the new behavior.
New concepts such as teamwork, motivation, training and a bottom up approach
have to be established and cultivated (Payer)
With the implementation of the ISM Code, levels of responsibility for the shore staff
is also to be defined. They are equally responsible for the ship safety and
environment protection. The advantage of the ISM Code is that it talks about safety
culture at all levels, involving both those at sea and ashore.
“The ISM Code is seen as a mechanism that gets down to the root cause of poor
safety standards, i.e. human error and lack of managerial control over human
performance and shipping performance, and thus offers the best outcome if
implemented properly” (Hawkins). The weakness in ISM Code implementation as
per the Final Report- Safer Shipping in the Asia Pacific Region Project (Phase 1),
conducted by the Asia Pacific Maritime Institute Australia appended in Annex 7.
Regulation 6 of Chapter IX of SOLAS authorizes control of a vessel for non-
compliance with the vessel’s safety management certificate in accordance with
SOLAS Chapter 1 and XI.
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The port State control officer has to use his professional judgement in deciding
whether a more detailed inspection is necessary. There has to be a clear ground for
doing that, which may include absent or inaccurate ISM Certification or detainable
deficiencies in other areas.
ISM may not help in improving the safety standard of the ship, if the owner or
operator is not serious about its implementation in the true sense. It does not imply
that a ship having ISM certification is safe. How can we justify the sinking of the bulk
carrier Leader L and tanker Erica
During a campaign period of concentrated inspection on ISM Code compliance,
from 1st July to 30th Sept. 98, by member Authorities of Tokyo MOU, total 1,820
inspections were carried out on ships to which the ISM Code was applicable. Almost
705 were bulk carrier. A total of 63 detentions involving 61 ships was recorded, all
due to improper ISM Code certification or major nonconformities in ship’s safety
management (Tokyo MOU Secretariat).
A survey carried out by the Swedish Club and a study released show that hull and
P &I claims have reduced steadily on ISM accredited ships when compared to non-
ISM ships. The Club is a firm believer in ISM and expects that with the approaching
2002 deadline for remaining vessels to be ISM accredited, the gap between the two
groups claims will begin to narrow (The Swedish Club).
During port State control inspection, where there is an objective evidence for
believing that the Master and crew are not familiar with essential shipboard
procedures as laid down in the ships manual relating to the safety of the ship or that
the ship’s certificate including ISM Code certificate are not in order, the port State
control officer can come to the conclusion that the system is not in order.
There are problems for the port State control officer, while carrying out ISM checks.
Like the language barrier. The manual may be in a different language than that
understood by the port State control officer. The Code requires that relevant
information on the safety management systems shall be given in the working
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language or languages understood by the crew. Even the records may be in a
different language. These are the practical problems, which are to be taken into
consideration.
Coming to the conclusion, the author wishes to state that the classification society
should play a major role in eradicating substandard ships. They are the ones who
are certifying the ships for issuance of Statutory and ISM certificate. While carrying
out port State control, it should be very clear in the mind of the officer that he is not
carrying out the audit. The port State control officer should mainly see that the
procedure between the company and those on board are running in a controlled
way.
If the ships are certified without compromise in the initial stage, and the owner
continues to maintain the ship, there is no need for a port State control to develop.
But, as we see, there are still a few operators who continue to ply their substandard
ships, inspite of all regulations. One incident like the Erika is good enough to malign
the whole shipping industry. The honest operator suffers more, he maintains his
vessel and after each incident, more new regulations are imposed on him.
To keep a check on such operators, who do not comply with the regulations, port
State control is the only answer. Close working relation between all the MOU’s is




The Need for Harmonized Regional Procedures and Global MOU on
port State control
“Of course, nowadays the industry plays an important role in ‘IMO deliberations and most
shipowners share IMO’s commitments to high standards. But there is still a minority - a small
minority –that tries to cut costs at the expense of safety but unfortunately this group puts a
cloud over the whole of the industry”. (Mr. William A.O’ Neil)
5.1 Why harmonized Regional procedures
Many ships are being detained for minor faults. If port State control is to be
successful, it should concentrate more forcefully on substandard vessels, in a
manner where it becomes difficult for the shipowners to operate unseaworthy ships.
The Paris MOU has harmonization of standards throughout the region as compared
to the other MOU’s as all member States have a developed Administration which is
in existence since 1982. The newly formed MOU’s member States are not at a
similar level of development and not so developed Administration.
If the port State control officer is not trained, there may be instances where ships are
detained for minor faults. Port State control officers should be able to identify a
substandard ship from a normal ship and take action accordingly. Because of the
existence of substandard ships, also ships that are properly maintained are
sometimes targeted and put to inconvenience.
There is a problem of uniformity in the implementation of port State control, and no
cooperation between all the regional agreements and has been a topic for
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discussion since the first port State control inspection began in the early 1980s. The
view point of classification societies regarding port State control inspection
consistency, as stated by ABS Pacific manager is:
“A surveyor needs years and years of training before he understands
what he is doing, but as port State control has developed very quickly
over a short period of time, they have had to find inspectors from all
sorts of area” further he states that “ frankly some of these inspectors
are not qualified for the job and that causes a big problem”
(Bousen, 1999b).
How far he is justified in making a statement of this magnitude towards the port
State control can only be confirmed if any statistics were provided. However there
must be some cases where port State control officers had been unjustified in
detaining vessels in the initial stages of port State control, or may be there are still
some cases where the port State control officer is wrong in his decision.
It is interesting to note the statement by a fleet director of a shipping management
company. He states: "With port State control inspection, the worst thing is that the
owners have no recourse except to deal with the same authority. There should be
some sort of center body to act as the judge and jury on this” (Bousen 1999b ).
In the Amendments to the procedures for the port State control, Resolution A.787
(19), it is stated that “the company or its representative have a right of appeal
against a detention taken by the Authority of a port State. The appeal should not
cause the detention to be suspended. The port State control officer should properly
inform the master of the right of appeal.” (IMO)
Pitfalls that could harm the program include:
• careless targeting;
• lack of professionalism or skills by an inspection party;
• incorrect application of standards;
• overzealous enforcement pointing out a  declaring a SOLAS intervention due to
unseaworthiness  but failing to note the vessel was on blocks in a dry-dock for
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planned repairs, or noting  a SOLAS intervention because dried paint was found
on the exterior of a fire nozzle, despite the paint having been scrapped off by a
crew member by a finger (Healey).
The consequences include a bad name to port State control, delays to ships
involved, wasted human resources and financial costs because of delays. On a
global level, world shipping has been hit by economic hard times. If port State
control is carried out poorly, the risk of economic harm is great.
With the adoption and successful operation of the Paris Memorandum of
Understanding (Paris MOU), over the last 18 years, it has become apparent that
regional operations are not only effective, but also more economical. But as stated
earlier, port State control can only be more effective when there is a harmonization
of standard throughout the globe.
A comment from a shipmaster is worth mentioning here, as they are the ones who
are facing all the inspections on arrival at the port:
“The effectiveness of port State control throughout Europe depends
on the state of mind of whichever inspector calls. For example in the
Netherlands, a vessel may be allowed to sail on the understanding
that the defects will be rectified when it is convenient, whereas in
neighboring Belgium the ship would be detained and appear with a
black mark in the Paris MOU on port State control quarterly figures”.
(“Port State----“)
Even after 14 years of implementation of port State control in Europe, harmonization
has not been achieved. It indicates what expectations may be made of other MOUs.
Some of the MOU members even have to start from the initial stage to establish an
Administration.
Nowadays, as soon as the gangway way is rigged on a ship in a port, instead of ship
chandlers, agents, laundry man, we have different inspectors waiting to approach
the Master. Instead of going ashore, reading mail from home for which they have
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been waiting after a long voyage, the ship crew has to attend to the port State
control officer, the classification surveyor or a oil major inspection. Later they have
to attend to the various deficiencies pointed out by the port State control officer or
other inspectors. These deficiencies may sometimes be minor in nature.
Are we making life easier for the seafarer? The same story goes on from one port to
the other. As more and more MOU’s are being signed, more inspections, more
paper work for the shipmasters and more authorities to be satisfied and entertained.
A global network of regional port State control agreements shall soon cover most of
the World’s ocean. The growth of MOU’s was inevitable and essential as
substandard ship continued to be operated at high seas, endangering the lives of
the seafarer and the environment. “IMO has been developing a global strategy for
port State control in order to ensure that, while the system may be regional, the
standards applied will be universal” (UN session 53rd session).
After the Paris MOU success in recognizing substandard ships, there has been no
looking back. More regional agreements were established and emerged in the same
form as Paris MOU. There was a need for it, as substandard ships driven out from
one region continued to operate in the other regions. To get rid of this menace, the
co-ordination and co-operation of all the States is needed. At the same time
harmonization of inspection is required.  As some maritime States do not even have
a maritime Administration and machinery to tackle this problem, there are no trained
surveyors to carry out the port State control.
The Paris and Tokyo MOU’s are striving for consistency. As per the report, Tokyo
MOU members have been working to harmonize port State control activities and
bring a level of uniformity to inspection standards. To achieve this, three level
programs have been implemented in the recent years:
• to provide basic training to 220 port State control officers in the region over a
five-year period. Goal looks to be achieved ahead of schedule;
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• expatriate mission program, where experienced port State control officer from
better developed port State control authorities are sent to work in less advanced
maritime Administrations. This program started in 1997 and expatriate missions
have been conducted; and
• to harmonize port State control procedures the scheme started in 1997, is the
port State control officers exchange program conducted among the more
developed maritime Administrations (Bousen,1999 b).
Paris MOU held its 29th port State control seminar in Bangor, UK. These seminars
are aimed at harmonizing port State control procedures throughout the region and
implementing control aspects of new international legislation. Apart from members
of the Paris MOU, participants from other States also attended as observers.
As a region we cannot effectively eradicate substandard ships. Similarly the various
Memoranda on port State control operating on their own, will not be able to
eradicate all substandard ships. What is required is a global harmonization of the
port State control inspection. This will also help in reducing the workload of
individual regions and the cost.
What we need to achieve this is a trust in each other’s inspections. To have trust,
we need to have a common standard of inspection. To achieve common standard of
inspection we have to have trained and experienced officers, who can carry out
inspection. Training is also to be of the same standard, all over. To achieve all this
we need a global relationship between all the Memorandums. It is too early to
achieve this, as some of the MOU’s are not more than in infancy stage, and some
MOU’s are still to be signed. But the ultimate aim should be to have a common
database and cooperation among all the MOU’s.
It is really surprising that during so many years all have been trying to get rid of
these substandard ships, but we are not able to do so. Even more surprising is that
it is not something like hidden from the eyes of the authorities concerned. Ships are
present in front of the eyes of the flag State, classification society and other
interested parties.
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Then why are we not able to single out the concerned parties? Year after year the
classification societies and flag State surveyors inspect the same vessels. They
board the vessels practically every year to issue or endorse statutory certificates.
Then how are these vessels able to get certificates? Does it mean that there are
some interested parties who are encouraging these vessels to ply?
The interest of these parties may be different for different reasons, may be
monetary, may be out of compulsion and may be political pressure. It is these
interested parties, who have given enough reasons for port State control to grow. It
is growing no doubt, and will continue to grow. As it will grow it will become stronger.
Strength comes from unity, and if all the MOU’s unite and work in tandem, there is
no reason, why these substandard ships cannot be chased out from the ocean in a
short period of time.
These substandard ships have no right and reason to ply, exposing the life of the
seafarers and the environment in danger. Most of these vessels have valid statutory
certificates, otherwise how do they get port clearance. Why not target those who
issues them the certificates, instead of targeting the ships. Why not eradicate the
origin of the substandard ship?
What happens if a vessel is issued with all statuary certificates at a port where there
is no effective port State control, and she is loaded with a cargo of oil. Due to being
substandard and unseaworthy she might break up after few days and cause
widespread pollution?
Now, in such a scenario, what can a port State do? The damage has already been
done! Port State control should not be forced to become stronger; instead the
parties who are responsible for making these substandard ship ply should be
targeted. It is like creating extra work for the others, and at the same time
endangering the life and the environment. One party issues a certificate to a
substandard ship, and then other’s have to identify. Why is this energy and money
being wasted to check what others have done wrong.
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Do we have substandard surveyors, or are they working under the instruction of
their superiors to close their eyes. Substandard owners will always be there. No
shipowner is interested in seeing his money being wasted in safety equipment, that
may not be used for the next 20 years, until he is forced by the rules and regulations
and commitments by the flag State for implementation.
Why do we have substandard parties to compromise with these substandard
shipowners? Why do we have oil companies to charter these ships? Why do we
have financiers to finance such ships?
Well, the answer to all these question is that shipping has been allowed to operate
like this for a long period of time. Compromises have been made with safety, so that
few owners can save money. But who suffers the most? It is the genuine operator
who suffers. He complies with all new regulations, still he is made to go through all
the inspections at various ports. Sometimes inspections by those who are not well
trained. How long will they go through this extra burden?
We are talking about fatigue of seafarer and its contribution towards accidents. Are
too many inspections not exposing the Master and the crew on arrival to the port in
contributing to the fatigue? In some cases the ship has to sail after a few hours of
stay at port. During that short time sometimes port State control inspection has to be
carried out. Until there is a commitment from all the parties concerned, things will
not change.
After the Erika incident, a lot of suggestions were made. Even some concerned
regarding the safety had suggested to have a third eye, during the special survey
and to have a different classification society surveyor to keep a watch on the survey
what one class is doing. What are we coming to? What happens, if this third eye
also compromises with the safety standard? How are we to be sure that the owner
will not influence this third eye?
There are actually three possible forms of port State control according to the






Advantages of unilateral control include:
• “it can be exercised to the extent deemed necessary by the port State;
• its scope can be enlarged to include the port State’s national requirements; and
• the commitment involved is determined exclusively by the port state.
Disadvantages include the following:
• its efforts can be less effective than when performed with other port States,
because;
♦ of the lack of relevant information from abroad;
♦ ships are no longer under surveillance once they sail from the port- state’s
territorial waters; and
♦ there are no ways to enforce or monitor rectification of deficiencies after the ship
has left  the port State territory.
• it is less cost effective since the full financial burden rests on the individual port
State;
• it places a disproportional burden on ship’s staff when compared with different
port State control programs in consecutive ports; and
• it may distort competition between regional ports like  ships may divert to ports
with more lenient safety regimes, thus creating commercial advantages.
Regional control
Advantages of regional control include:
• maximum commitment from participating countries that share common safety
and environmental interests,
• effective use of regionally available information;
• ships remain under surveillance as long as they operate in the region , reducing
the possibilities for substandard operations;
• operational costs are shared by all participating port States;
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• a harmonized approach to procedures lowers the burden on ship’s staffs and
permits effective deployment of available resources of participating States; and
harmonized procedures prevent distortion of competition between regional ports.
Disadvantage include:
• It is only effective in preventing substandard ship operations in the particular
region, and tends to shift them to other areas.
Global control
Advantages of global control include:
• it will have maximum impact on substandard operations because ships will
remain  under constant ,world wide surveillance;
• it ensures maximum availability of relevant information to port states;
• it implicitly allows for maximum harmonization of control performances; and
      the cost of operation is minimal.
Disadvantages include:
• it lacks sufficient commitment by participating States for geographical reasons;
• it would require an international treaty to administer ,implying:
• lengthy ratification procedures;
• time consuming, rigid amendment procedures, and
• much compromise required, which is detrimental to the necessary commitment;
and
• difficulty in adjusting to maritime developments requiring immediate response”.
(Huibers)
Mr. Huibers, further stated that considering the advantages and disadvantages of
the three options, it is easy to conclude that port State control should be
accomplished through concentrated regional efforts. Indeed, it eliminates the
disadvantages of unilateral control and allows for more commitment on the part of
participants than global control.
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5.1.1 Various Existing MOU
As discussed in previous chapters, the problem of substandard ships can only be
eliminated by regional cooperation, hence various MOU on port State control came
into existence.
The history of MOU can be traced back to the Hague MOU, which was a MOU
between certain Maritime Authorities for maintenance of standards on merchant
ships. Following the Amoco Cadiz disaster, the Hague MOU was superseded by the
Paris MOU which was signed on January 26th, 1982. The signing of various MOU’s
on port State control can be attributed to the adoption of the Paris MOU and the IMO
Resolution A. 682 where in States are encouraged to reach regional agreements
dealing with port State control (Keselji).
The function of member States of MOU’s can be summed as follows:
• targeting of substandard ships;
• inspection to find out if there are clear grounds for extended inspection;
• deficiencies if any ;
• serious/non serious deficiencies as per the professional judgement of the port
State control officer;
• rectification of deficiencies prior sailing;
• if not serious allow the ship to sail to next port, if not able to rectify;
• detention if necessary.
For targeting of ships, different MOU’s have laid down different criteria and
guidelines for the member States, for instance Paris MOU have a targeting factor as
described in Annex 8.
Existing regional agreements on port State control
• the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on port State control (Paris MOU),
adopted in Paris on 1st July 1982;
• The Latin American agreement (Acuardode Vina Del Mar agreeement on port
State control ) signed in Vina Del Mar in Chile in November 1992;
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• the Memorandum of Understanding on port State control  in the Asia-Pacific
Region (Tokyo MOU), signed in Tokyo (Japan) on 2nd December 1993;
• the Memorandum of Understanding on port State control in the Mediterranean
Region (Mediterranean MOU), signed in Valletta( Malta) on 11th July 1997;
• the Memorandum of Understanding)on port State control in the Caribbean
Region (Caribbean MOU), signed in Christchurch (Barbados) on 9th
February1996;
• the Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on  port  State control (Indian
ocean MOU) signed in Pretoria (South Africa) on 5th June 1996;and
• the Memorandum of Understanding for the West and Central African Region
(Abuja MOU), signed in Abuja (Nigeria) on 22nd October1999.
• the Memorandum of Understanding for the Black Sea (Black Sea MOU), signed
in Istanbul, (Turkey) on 7th April 2000.
Relevant instruments
For the purpose of the Memorandum following are the relevant instruments for Paris
and Tokyo MOU’s.
• the International Convention on Load Lines, 1996 (LOAD LINES 66);
• the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International convention on Load Lines,1966
(LL PROT 88);
• the International convention for the Safety of Life at sea, 1974 (SOLAS 74);
• the protocol of 1978 relating to the International convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea,1974 (SOLAS PROT 88);
• the International convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,1973,as
modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78);
• the  International convention on  Standards of Training, certification and Watch
keeping for Seafarers,1978 (STCW 78); (as amended 1995)
• the Convention on the International Regulation for preventing Collisions at
Sea,1972 (COLREG 72);
• the International Convention on tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969
(TONNAGE 69);
• the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 (ILO Convention
No. 147) (ILO 147).
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Application of the clause “no more favorable treatment”
All existing MOU’s have included the no more favorable clause for ships entitled to
fly the flag of a State, which is not a party to the relevant instruments in the
memorandum. In order to carry out more detailed or expanded inspection as
appropriate, in case there is no certificates representing prima facie evidence of
satisfactory conditions on board, the port State control officer will follow the same
procedures as provided for ships to which the relevant instruments are applicable.
In the Paris MOU additional requirements are included, such as evidence of
satisfactory manning as per STCW and holding valid certificates. If the ship or the
crew has some alternative form of certification, the port State control officer, in
making this inspection, may take the content of this documentation under
consideration.
Paris MOU.
The Paris MOU on port State control is the official document in which the 18
participating Maritime Authorities agree to implement a harmonized system of port
State control. The MOU consists of a main body in which the Authorities agree on:
• their commitment and the relevant international conventions;
• the inspection procedures and the investigation of operational procedures;
• the exchange of information ;
• the structure of the agreements and amendment procedure;
• the members recognizing that the effective action by the port State is required to
prevent the operation of substandard ships; and
• mindful that the responsibility for the effective application of standards laid down
in international instruments rests upon the authorities of the State whose flag a
ship is entitled to fly;
• need to avoid distorting competition between ports.
      Convinced of the necessity, for these purposes,
• of an improved and harmonized system of port State control;
• of strengthening cooperation; and
• have reached the understanding which is detailed in the memorandum.
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Provides that all costs related to the inspection to be charged to the owner or
operator of the ship if the ship is detained and there is a European Union directive to
this effect (Boisson).
Other activities of Paris MOU:
• the Paris MOU conducts seminars regularly. The seminars are attended by port
State control officers from Paris MOU as well as participants from the Tokyo
MOU, Vina del Mar Agreement, United States Coast Guard and others;
• it is also taking an initiative in establishing a program of advanced training of port
State control officers in order to keep abreast of technological change in the
maritime field and of corresponding regulatory development;
• monthly lists of companies responsible for the operation of ships detained more
than once or having more than one ship detained within the previous 12 months
are issued. Data concerning the performance of classification societies are
published as per the detentions (Paris MOU; 5/99; what’s new);
• concentrated inspection campaign on structural safety of bulk carriers were
carried out by European and Canadian port State control authorities. Vessels
targeted were of more than 30,000 gt and more than 15 years old, particularly
those transporting high density or corrosive cargoes and trading on the spot
market (Tinsley).
The concentrated campaign result on bulk carriers revealed that, whilst checks on
the structural safety of large bulk carriers calling at European and Canadian ports
have shown some improvements, serous defects are still being found. The detention
rate of bulk carriers during the campaign of three months was 10% compared with
the whole of 1998 of 13.9% (Paris MOU, 1999a).
These concentrated inspection campaigns are announced and done. They are not
like unannounced port State controls. They have their advantages and disadvantage
 The advantages are as follows:
• owners, charterers, and classification societies, will be on alert;
• any maintenance due will be carried out prior to coming to any port;
• can concentrate more on structural inspection in case of bulk carriers.
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Disadvantage of concentrated inspection campaign is as follows:
• defects can be listed and shown to the port State control officer, that corrective
action is in progress;
• some operators may avoid the ports, during such a campaign.
In June 1999 Paris MOU held its 28th port State control seminar in Antwerp,
Belgium, which aimed at harmonizing port State control procedures throughout the
region and implementing control aspects of new international legislation. During the
32nd meeting of the port State control Committee, which took place in May 1999,
new amendments to the Paris MOU on port State control concerning High Speed
Crafts were adopted (Paris MOU,1999b).
Statistics of port State control, Paris MOU
Source: Paris MOU Annual Report 1998
From the information contained in graphs 5.1 to 5.5, the following observations can
be made. The efforts by Paris MOU to eradicate substandard ships is observed.
The numbers of deficiencies observed have been increasing from 1982 to date. All
the member States are not yet able to reach the target of 25% of foreign ships to be
inspected as the minimum target. Reasons could be that they are not getting a
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Graph 5.1 : Number of Ships Detained
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Source: Paris MOU Annual reports 1998
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Graph 5.3 : Number of Deficiencies Observed
Source Paris MOU Annual Report1998
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Source: Paris MOU Annual Report  1998
Source Paris MOU Annual Report 1998
Tokyo MOU:
The Memorandum was concluded in Tokyo on 1st December 1993, with 18 maritime
authorities as members. The main objective of the Memorandum is to establish an
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Graph 5.4. Inspection by Individual Members as Compared to the Target.
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and harmonization, to eliminate substandard shipping so as to promote maritime
safety, to protect the marine environment and to safeguard working and living
conditions on board.
The Tokyo MOU came into effect on 1st April 1994. The text of the Memorandum
and relevant instruments are the same as in the Paris MOU. The Paris and Tokyo
MOUs had a Joint Ministerial Conference on port State control. It was the first joint
Ministerial Conference on 24th March 1998 in Vancouver, Canada, aimed at
concentrated action to increase the pressure on sub-standard shipping. The
conference was the sixth for the Paris MOU but was the first for the Tokyo MOU
members. The highlights of the Conference were:
• 31 signatories to the Paris and Tokyo MOU members attended the Conference
• Representatives from Iceland, the United States ,Vietnam, ILO, IMO, Acuerdo
de Vina del Mar MOU on port State control, Caribbean MOU on port State
control and International Association of Classification Societies,
• Joint Ministerial Declaration on “ Tightening the Net”-Inter-regional action to
eliminate Sub-standard Shipping was signed.
Efforts to link the Tokyo MOU’s APCIS system with the Paris MOU’s own database
SIRENAC are in the pipeline. To provide a better indication of the unseaworthy
ships the port State control Committee in the Asia Pacific region has decided to
develop a computer-based system to target such ships for inspection. The system
will be linked to the Asia Pacific Computerized Information System (APCIS), and will
assist the 17 member authorities of the Tokyo MOU to identify which ships to
inspect. It will generate a figure, indicating the priority, and based on a series of
weighted criteria. Something like the target factor for the Paris MOU. The committee
also increased the regional inspection percentage from 50 percent to 75 percent
(Toh).
Targeting the real substandard ships will help the port State control officer to devote
his time more to inspecting substandard ships, rather than inspecting the good ones.
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Overview of port State control results of Tokyo MOU: 1994-1998
                      Source: Annual Report 1998 Tokyo MOU
Source: Annual Report 1998 Tokyo MOU
From the information contained in graphs 5.6 to 5.8 we observe that the number of
inspections during the four-year period has increased by nearly 70%. The numbers
of ships with deficiencies have gone up from 45% to 60 %. This may be attributed to
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Graph: 5.7 No.Of Ships With Deficiencies
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Source. Tokyo MOU Annual report 1998
Mediterranean MOU
Following are the commitments by all the members to have an effective and
harmonized port State control in the region:
• to take all necessary steps to ratify instruments relevant for the purposes of the
Memorandum;
• an effective system of port State control with a view to ensuring that, without
discrimination as to flag, foreign merchant ships visiting the ports of its State
comply with relevant regulations;
• to achieve within a period of 3 years from the coming into effect of the
Memorandum an annual inspection of 15% of the estimated number of individual
foreign merchant ships visiting the ports of its state during a period of 12
months.
Relevant instruments are the same as in the Paris MOU, except the two mentioned
below:
• the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International convention on Load Lines,1966;
• the International Convention on tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969
In the selection of ships, priority is given to the following types of ships:
• ships visiting a port of a State, the authority of which is a signatory to the
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• ships which have been  permitted to leave the port of a State , the Authority of
which is a signatory to the Memorandum, on the condition that the deficiencies
noted must be rectified within a specified period, upon expiry of such period;
• ships which have been reported by pilots or port authorities as having
deficiencies which may prejudice their safe navigation;
• ships whose statutory certificates on the ship’s construction and equipment have
not been issued in accordance with the relevant instruments;
• ships carrying dangerous or polluting goods, which have failed to report all
relevant information concerning the ship particulars, the ship movement and
concerning the dangerous or polluting  goods being carried to the competent
authority of the port and coastal State;
• ships which have been suspended from their class for safety reasons in the
course of the preceding six months.
There is nothing mentioned about ships, which have deficiencies that cannot be
rectified at the port, and whose flag State is not a member of the Memorandum. It is
not clear whether these vessels will be allowed to sail to the next port or not?
Section 6 of the memorandum, regarding training programs and seminars, provides
that the authorities will endeavor to establish appropriate training programs and
seminars.
It is submitted that training and seminars should be given top priority for port State
control officers. Most of the members of the various MOU’s lack the expertise
required. They need to be trained. Before adopting the Agreement, Maritime
Authorities should ensure that they have a minimum number of qualified port State
control officers. The other MOU members can train them. Minimum training should
be imparted at the earliest.
In this way the standard of inspection will be the same in all members States from
the time the MOU starts functioning. At present the States are becoming members
and then they decide about the training.
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Indian Ocean MOU
The relevant instruments are the same as in the Paris MOU except the Protocol of
1988 relating to the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966. Each authority
will achieve within a period of 3 years from the coming into effect of the
Memorandum an annual total of inspection corresponding to at least 10% of the
estimated number of individual foreign merchant ships visiting the ports during a
recent representative period of 12 months. Other details were discussed in chapter
2.
MOU on port State control in the Caribbean Region
Relevant instruments are same as the Paris MOU except the two mentioned below:
• the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International convention on Load Lines,1966;
• the International Convention on tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969.
Commitments by all the members to achieve the inspection target:
Apart from establishing and maintaining an effective system of port State control, the
States will endeavor to achieve, within a period of 3 years from the coming into
effect of the Memorandum, an annual total of inspections corresponding to 15% of
the estimated number of ships entering the ports. According to the report six
members deposited letters of acceptance in 1996, two in 1997 and one each in
1998 and 1999. Hence each of these Sates must, within three years of accepting
the Caribbean MOU, achieve the target inspection rate of 15% of the annual number
of ships calling at its port’.
The MOU was signed in February 1996 at a meeting attended by 14 Caribbean
States, but not all have joined it yet because of their lack of Maritime Administration
and inspection facilities. The 10 Caribbean countries, which have joined to the MOU,
are gradually implementing the necessary reforms to make the system work
properly (Renwick).
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(Vina Del Mar Agreement 1992) Latin-American Agreement on port State
control.
The Maritime Authorities of this Agreement pursue the objectives of the Operative
Network of Regional Maritime Co-operation among Maritime Authorities (ROCRAM)
strategy adopted in 1989 for the Protection of the Marine environment, and for
adoption of an effective ship control system and development of a coordinated
system of inspections.
The relevant instruments are the same as are applicable to the Paris MOU except
the following:
• the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International convention on Load Lines,1966;
• the International Convention on tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969 ;
• the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 (ILO Convention
No. 147) (ILO 147).
The ILO 147 is not included, which is for the carrying out of inspections of working
and living condition under port State control. No mention about the training
programs and seminars for port State control officers.
West and Central African Region
The signatory meeting for the establishment of a port State control agreement took
place in October 1999. Participating in the meeting were delegations from 19 States,
of which 16 signed the MOU. The first meeting of the port State control Committee
has been scheduled for October 2000.
This is the only Memorandum which has emphasized and noted the established
training methods and programs for port State control officers and the urgent need to
implement a training program for the port State control officers in the region.
The relevant instruments are all the same as are listed for the Paris MOU,
except the following:
• the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International convention on Load Lines,1966;
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• the Memorandum has in detail regarding inspection on board ships under the
Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 (ILO Convention
147)
Commitments
Most of the commitments are same as in other MOU’s. The target is 15% of the
estimated number of foreign ships visiting the ports in the period of 12 months,
within 3 years after the Memorandum comes into effect.
 A comparative table of different MOU’s is appended in Annex 9. Source IMO news
 (1). 2000
5.1.2 Regions yet to establish MOU
After the signing of Black Sea MOU the only region left is the Persian Gulf region. At
a meeting organized by the Marine Emergency Mutual aid Center Bahrain, in co-
operation with the Gulf Co-operation Council and IMO, a first draft of a regional port
State control for the ROPME  (Regional Organization for the Protection of the
Marine Environment) sea area and the complementary training programs for its
implementation was discussed in July 1999 in Manama, at Bahrain.
Delegates from the following States attended the meeting:
Bahrain Kuwait Oman
Qatar SaudiArabia United Arab Emirates.
A second meeting is expected to see the signature of a MOU on port State control.
According to David Gibbons, executive director of Dubai Ports Authority a MOU on
the implementation of port State control is being negotiated between the UAE, Iran,
Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Iran is already a member of the Indian
Ocean MOU and took the initiation for Gulf countries to take positive steps towards
an agreement. Gibbons said that, without agreement, sub-standard vessels from all
over the world would end up in the region, and there were already many such ships
present  (“Gulf States-------“).
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Delegates from Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, the Russian Federation, Turkey and
the Ukraine attended a first preparatory meeting for the establishment of a port State
control regime in the Black Sea region which took place in Varna, Bulgaria, from 14th
to 17th September 1999. The meeting agreed a draft MOU and a related draft-
training program was considered (Hoppe). It is also observed that most of the States
in the Central America are not yet members of any MOU.
5.1.3 Improvements in port State control after introduction of MOU’s
Table No 5A: Paris MOU inspection figures1992-1998
Year Individual
ships
Inspections Deficiencies Detentions Detention %
1992 10,455 14,783 27,136 588 5.6
1993 11,252 17,294 43,071 926 8.2
1994 10,694 16,964 53,210 1597 14.9
1995 10,563 16,381 54,451 1837 17.4
1996 10,256 16,070 53,967 1719 16.8
1997 10,719 16,813 53,311 1624 15.2
1998 11,168 17,643 57,831 1598 14.3
Source: Bimco review 2000
There has been a substantial rise in the number of deficiencies and subsequent
detentions. In 1992, 588 ships were detained and it went to 1837 in 1995.The
positive effect of port State control is clearly seen as the number of inspection has
increased, but the number of detentions has come down in 1997 and 1998.
Targeting of particular types of vessels also increases after accidents take place. As
it happened after the Estonia, passenger ships and ferries were targeted. This can
be seen by the number of detentions, which increased in cases of passenger ships.
Although the number of inspections of passenger ships and ferries remained the
same as in 1993, the number of detentions went up to 331 vessels, almost triple the
numbers in 1993.
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After the Erika incident, port State control authorities targeted most of the old
tankers. It is because of a human nature to be more careful and go into details, after
such accidents. It is also because of the public pressure and the media pressure
after tanker causality. Most of the vessels targeted were having some deficiencies.
From graph 5.9 below we observe that the number of ships being lost at sea has
come down in the last four years from 1994 to 1997. This may be due to port State
control being more effective, and that substandard ships have no place to go except
the scrap yard.
5.2 Role of IMO in a Global MOU on port State control
As we see from the different regional memoranda, all members have committed
themselves to comply with IMO conventions to eliminate substandard ships. One of
the goals of the organization is to ensure the consistent and effective
implementation of IMO instruments globally. Through Resolution A.777 (18) and
A.900 (21), it reaffirmed the contents of resolution A.500 (XII) and thus the
assignment of the highest priority in promoting the implementation of relevant
international instruments for the improvement of maritime safety and pollution
prevention.
Graph 5.9 : Total Loses as  a  Percentage  of  Shipping  Afloat 
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The ultimate effectiveness of any instruments depends inter alia upon all States, and
can be achieved in the following stages:
• becoming a party to the IMO instruments;
• implementing them fully and effectively;
• enforcing them rigorously; and
• reporting to the Organization, as required.
The IMO urges governments in their efforts to improve safety of life at sea and to
protect the marine environment and to carry out, at regular intervals at their
discretion, a self assessment of their capabilities and performance in giving full and
complete effect to the various instruments to which they are party. The procedure for
port State control resolution A.787(19) adopted on 23rd November 1995, was
amended by Resolution A.882(21) adopted on 25th November 1999.
The following are the main changes made in the amendments
• the SOLAS Protocol 1988 and Load Line Protocol 1988 have been included;
• when a ship is detained, the affect on the normal schedule of the departure of
the ship will not be considered;
• when examining 1969 Tonnage certificates, the port State control officer’s
attention is drawn to the guidelines for port State control under the 1969
Tonnage Convention. The tonnage is important to determine which regulations
apply to a specific ship;
• guidelines for port State control related to the ISM Code have been included;
• suspension of inspection.
• procedures for rectification of deficiencies and release after detention;
• the company or its representative has a right of appeal against a detention
imposed by the authority of a port. The appeal should not cause the detention to
be suspended. The port State control officer should properly inform the Master
of the right of appeal;
• the port State control officer in exceptional circumstances, where a result of a
detailed inspection ship and its equipment are found to be substandard, may
suspend the inspection.
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To suspend the inspection, the judgement of the officer is very important. It should
not be misused. He should not suspend the inspection after noticing few detainable
deficiencies. This new section may have been included as some shipowners were
using port State control as a tool for making their defect list. If a ship has a defect list
of say 30 to 40, what a port State control officer is actually doing is the job of a
Superintendent. Now with this section included he can take a decision for
suspending the inspection. But before suspending he should record all the
detainable deficiencies he has noted. He should notify all the concerned parties
about the detention and suspension without delay.
The Sub-Committee on Flag State implementation during its 8th Session established
a correspondence group on certain aspects of port State control. Issues to be
considered by the correspondence group includes:
• to improve the reporting of detentions by port States control to flag States; and
• mechanisms for constructive and timely dialogue between the flag States and
port States on port State control intervention (IMO, 2000a).
For harmonization, the activities planned by IMO include workshops at IMO
headquarters for the secretaries and directors of existing port State control
agreements. IMO has developed a global project to provide assistance to emerging
port State control agreements in order to:
• facilitate the harmonization of procedures;
• inter-regional co-operation; and
• exchange of information between the various agreements.
With the information available as a result of regional co-operation in port State
control, IMO is advancing towards a change of attitude within the shipping industry,
where a long tradition of secrecy too often results in problems being hidden and
ignored rather than revealed and solved (Plaza 1999a). The IMO can play a leading
role in establishing a Global MOU. By Global MOU it is meant that all the MOU’s
establish a harmonized system of port State control and a network can be formed.
All the data can be at a central place, say IMO Headquarters, and IMO can
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coordinate with different MOU’s, great amount of coordination is required to achieve
this.
Equasis: the author feels that this is a step towards globalization of data
information, which can later be utilized for the global MOU on port State control. The
Maritime Administrations of France, United Kingdom, Spain, Singapore and the
European Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the
setting up of the Equasis information system on 28th January 2000. The twin aims of
Equasis are transparency and accessibility
The purpose of the Memorandum is to set up an effective operation of a system on
quality and safety related information of the world’s merchant fleet. In the first phase,
Equasis will contain information from Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and US Coast Guard
on port State control and detentions, also information provided by the industry. It will
be more of a data information center, in one place and would be a first step towards
globalization of data.
5.3 Elements for harmonized regional procedures:
5.3.1 Training as per IMO model course
To achieve the desired result of port State control depends, much on the port State
control officer, and how good may be the system of information and administrative
mechanism. If the officer who is carrying out the inspection is not to the mark, the
whole concept of port State control will be lost. The training itself is not sufficient for
a good port State control officer. He or she should have a good sea going
background and relevant experience.
Sometimes the time available to him is not enough to carry out a complete
inspection. He should be able to judge and take a decision on the spot whether a
detailed inspection is required or not. Sometimes he has to take a decision about
detention. There are certain deficiencies for which the port State control officer has
to take a decision whether to issue a detention order or make it just deficiencies. In
some States, if the ship is detained, re inspection fees charged are quite high.
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The IMO has developed a model course to assist maritime training institutes and
their training staff in organizing and introducing new training courses or in
enhancing, updating or supplementing existing training material, where the quality
and effectiveness of the training courses may thereby be improved.
The port State control officer should be conversant with all the Conventions,
applicable to a particular type of ship. He should also be aware of the Conventions
ratified by his State, as only those will be applicable while carrying out the
inspection. Any wrongful detention will be liable for compensation. As well, it will
give a bad name for the port State. The credibility of the port State will be lost, if a
ship is unduly detained.
The Tokyo and Paris MOUs have been consistent in providing training to port State
control officers. The continuous implementation of training activities and technical
cooperation program has played a very important role in promoting port State
control activities in the region. Ever since the establishment of the Tokyo MOU, the
training of port State control officers have been given high priority. It has
endeavored to provide and enlarge technical cooperation program within the region.
5.3.2 Regional MOU’s meetings
To eliminate substandard ships from the ocean, what we need is a concerted global
effort. To achieve this, co-operation and coordination is required among all the
MOU’s on port State control. Some MOU’s may need more help from the others,
who are more developed. Meetings among the various MOU’s may be the right
direction to achieve this.
The Tokyo and Paris MOU did have a joint Ministerial meeting. The trusts among
the MOU’s have to be built up so as to recognize the inspection carried out by the
other MOU. At present, even the inspection carried out by the two most developed
MOU’s, Paris and Tokyo are not recognized by each other. That means if the ship is
inspected by a Tokyo MOU member and if it visits a port in one of the member State
of the Paris MOU, she could be subjected to port State control inspection. All what
result from this, is more expenditure and more manpower.
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5.3.3 Qualified and sufficient port State control officers.
The success of any port State control regime depends on the officer who is carrying
out the inspection. The ship’s identification as a seaworthy ship or not is to be
decided by him. A wrong decision can lead to arbitration as well as monetary loss to
the owner, delay in the schedule of the ship and a bad name for the port.
To exercise effective and fair port State control, emphasis should be placed on the
competence and ability of the surveyors carrying out the inspection. The number of
port State control officers required is also important. It will depend on the ship traffic
in that particular region. A good inspection can only be carried out if the officer
concerned is not overworked.
5.4 Need for a Global MOU.
At present we have seven MOU’s operating in the World, Black Sea MOU which is
the eighth MOU was signed in April 2000. Now only one more MOU remains to be
signed. Seven MOU’s operating at different places will have around 109 members.
The level of expertise and competence of the different Administrations is different.
Some of them don’t even have any trained port State control officers and the
establishment to carry out flag State duties. They have delegated all the Statutory
work to classification societies. With this scenario there is unfortunately, bound to be
different levels of port State control inspection in each region.
For harmonization the standard of inspection should be the same all over. To
achieve this, first the MOU would have to have harmonization among all the
members and then all MOU’s have to have harmonization.
When there is harmonization on a global basis, what will be achieved is listed below:
• when all the MOU’s are linked together, and the data is stored at one place, it
will be easier to target the substandard ship. What happens now, if suppose a
vessel is allowed to sail from one port, with certain deficiencies. According to the
procedures the port State control would have to inform the authorities of the next
port of call. Now suppose for some reason the next port of call of the ship is not
informed. The ship may not have rectified the deficiencies, or may declare a
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wrong port of call to the authorities, or even divert the vessel to a different port. If
the data is available to the port,  it is updated by the port State control authorities
After the  carrying out of the inspection he can have access and keep a check
on the ship on arrival regardless of  whichever port the vessel visits;
• once all the Memoranda have trained their port State control officer, the
standard of inspection will be the  same to some extent;
• if a ship is inspected by one MOU and she sails to a region where another  MOU
is in force, the port State control officer of that MOU will also board the ship, may
be within a span of a month. If there is a link between the MOU’s the need to re-
inspect a ship  after a month will not be there;
• the cost of MOU’s will come down with harmonization, which is a important
factor for some of the developing States;
• the manpower saved by harmonizing the MOU’s inspection, can be very well
utilized for flag State implementation, which indirectly will benefit the quality of
ships, and may be less port State control detention will follow. There will be
more monetary benefit for the shipowner by not having his ship detained;
• there will be more time for the ship’s staff to channel their energies into more
productive work, than to prepare the ship for too many inspections. The
argument against this can be that ships should always be ready for inspection,
as they are supposed to be always seaworthy. But as any seafarer will testify,
the experience is that for any inspection on board ship, the equipment’s are
always tried out, before the surveyor boards the ship, by the ship staff;
• targeting of substandard ships will be easier;
• the operator of the substandard ship will have no place to go, once all the ports




“The changes that are taking place in this industry offer us tremendous advantages and
opportunities to improve safety and to reduce pollution. Our technical knowledge is greater
than ever before and the amount of information at our disposal is growing all the time. If we
use this wisely we should be able to work out why accidents occur and take steps to prevent
them. We should be able to use other data to identify sub-standard ships and operators and
then to target them for impossible for these menaces to operate at al ”(William A. O’ Neil).
In the previous chapters what the author has wished to express is about the
problems of substandard ships, which exist all over. Even port State control is not
always able to identify ships like the Erika, operating mainly in Europe, which has
the most well established regime of port State control inspections.
What port State is doing at present is deterring the operators who are more sincere
in their operation of ships. The owners who wish to ply their substandard ships
always find some means to operate them. But this does not mean that the control
should not be there. May be there would have been more Erika like tragedies if
there was no port State control. Port State may prevent some needless loss of lives
and may reduce marine pollution. It is no substitute for effective flag State control,
and on it own, is unable to eliminate substandard ships.
To avoid accident instances like the Erika and Leader L, what is required is that all
concerned parties such as owners, flag States, classification societies, insurers and
charters should fulfil their respective responsibilities:
• flag States should have a commitment to comply with the IMO requirements,
such as implementation of all Conventions, on ships flying its flag.
• substandard ships cannot be eliminated without the cooperation of those who
are responsible of certifying the ship’s seaworthiness. Classification societies
are in a competitive world, trying to get business at any cost. The classification
societies are the ones responsible for issuing the statutory certificates, in most of
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the States. IACS may have to play a major role to see that the standards of the
member societies are not eroded. Surveyors should be well trained and
committed to their jobs. Ultimately, a lot depends on the owners. If the owner
wishes to maintain his ship to the best standard, no one will stop him, but at
times due to commitments to cargo owners and others short cuts are taken even
by good operators. Owners should give safety the highest priority. Charterers
should charter ships, which are well maintained.
Port State control has a long way to go in their commitment to eradicate
substandard ships. More co-operation and exchange of data is required. The system
must also be more efficient. It should not be just to fulfil the annual target, and be
content with a few detentions. Detentions of ship statistics should not be regarded
as an efficient port State control system. States experienced in maritime
Administration should assist other States to establish a port State control system, to
get an enhanced and better-targeted port State control and reduction of the number
of inspection of ships of good ship operators.
Effective port State control leads to shipowners being compelled to maintain their
ships for fear of detention. It helps in safeguarding the safety of the seafarer lives
and the environment, and identifies substandard ships. It also helps to identify flag
States that fail to implement IMO and internationally agreed minimum standards,
and drives out such ships to other areas where port State control is not effective. It
puts pressure on substandard ship’s operators.
We finally achieve nothing if we allow substandard ships to operate in some other
region. Trying to get rid of the problem in one area and creating a problem in
another, because the other State is not equipped to identify the substandard ships is
not the solution.
If we are serious about eradicating substandard ships and protecting our
environment we have to cooperate and have faith in other’s inspection reports and
strive for a harmonized system to achieve more in less time.
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In order to keep track of a ship, which has been inspected, and allowed to sail to
rectify the outstanding deficiencies at next port, authorities are required to inform the
next port of call. Sometimes it may happen that, due to some unavoidable reason
the authorities are not informed. In such a scenario the Master can easily deny
having been subjected to any port State inspection at the last port. So in order to
keep track, a port State control record book should be made mandatory by the
MOU’s so that all-important entries are made regarding the inspection.
The following are the advantages of having a global MOU:
With global MOU expenses can be reduced means better cost benefit, can do with a
less staff, need not inspect all the ships visiting port, if already done by another
MOU member. Ship staff has more time to attend to urgent needs on arrival at port,
rather than to follow port State control officer. Leads to more cooperation and
interaction among the MOU’s. Identification of substandard ship will be easier. There
will be no place for the substandard ship to go, if all the MOU’s are having the
information and data. This way we can achieve more harmonized system of
inspection.
What we need to do to achieve the above are set out below:
Commitment from all the members of the various MOU’s. Well trained and
experienced port State control officers. Harmonization of inspection procedure
among all the MOU’s. To start with, control officers from one region can travel to the
neighboring States to carry out port State control together with a local officer, so as
to build confidence in the inspection report. Information sharing among all the
MOU’s and acceptance of other MOU’s inspection report.
What is happening now is that the owner of the ship is not penalized much. What he
loses is some days to rectify the defects, and the cost to comply with the defects
pointed out by the port State control officer and inspection fees if the ship is
detained. If the penalty imposed is made more stringent; if the ship is found to be
substandard, and the ship is not allowed to discharge cargo or to load cargo, the
shipowners will be more careful.
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The other area, which has to be looked into, is the flag State. Flag States who do
not have a proper maritime Administration have to develop one, so as to make the
flag State stronger. Each State may have to identify their shortcomings. Some may
have to reorganize their structure keeping in mind the new responsibility of port
State control.
In India, to get a more effective port State control, more sub offices may have to be
opened, so as to cover all the region. For instance in a State like Gujarat shipping
activities are increasing. There may also be a need to appoint more Surveyors.
To analyze the need for port State control or whether port State control is really
effective some points have already been covered in the previous chapters, but if we
go by the statistics available on port State control we observe that most ships, which
are found to have deficiencies or are being detained are registered with flags of
convenience or open registries. Some of them even do not have proper
adminstration. They must be eliminated to eradicate substandard ships. Also the
spirit of port State control can be converted into financial gain as a source of income
by those who allow substandard ships to ply thereby causing unethical competition
between well kept ships where the cost of operation is higher than substandard
ships thereby forcing the need for port State control.
To have an exchange of information between MOU’s and member States, the
database to be developed should be compatible with other systems around the
world to be effective and improve communication between member States.
The opinions of the Secretaries of various existing MOU’s and others was solicited
through a questionnaire. The following points were raised:
• What is the effectiveness of port State control in eradicating substandard ships,
after the various MOU’s came into existence.
• Does cooperation between MOU’s help in eradicating substandard ships?
• Will exchange of data between all MOU’s help in eradicating substandard ships?
• Establishing of a common database.
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• Is there a need for a Global MOU to achieve common standard all over the
globe.
The replies received have been quite encouraging. Copies of the replies are
appended in Annex 9. A summary of the opinion of the Secretaries and Chairman of
the various MOU’s is set out below:
• The MOU’s on port State control have indeed helped in eradicating substandard
ships.
• Exchange of port State control inspection information will provide a tool for
tracking substandard ships and targeting ships for inspection.
• The establishment of common database may not be feasible in the present
situation, linking of database could be thought off.
• A Global MOU can be achieved by linking all the databases. There need not be
a separate organization, it should be within the framework of IMO.
Harmonoization and convergence of port State control is even being thought of by
the IMO. Speaking at the Fourth Port State Control Conference held in London, Mr.
Plaza stated that bringing the various existing regional agreements in line with each
other will create a “global mosaic” and ensure that substandard ships find it harder
to operate (Reyes, 2000b).
A Global MOU on port State control need not be a separate Convention because
that would require a long procedure for ratification. What is required is an
understanding between various MOU’s, and cooperation and coordination to
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Australia * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Bangladesh * * * * * * *
Djibouti * * * * * *
Eritrea * * * * *
Ethiopia * * * * * * *
India * * * * * * * * * * *
Iran * * * * * * * *
Kenya * * * * * *
Maldives * * * * * *
Mauritius * * * * * * *
Mozambique * * * * * * *
Myanmar * * * * * * *
Seychelles * * * * * * * * *
South Africa * * * * * * * * *
Sri Lanka * * * * * * * *
Sudan * * * *
Tanzania * * *
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 Flags dominating world shipping
 
 Top 40 flags in 1999 (ships of 300 gt and over)
 Rank  Flag  No of Ships  Total DWT (000)  DWT % Share of World
Fleet
 1  Panama  5036  151323  19.9
 2  Liberia  1659  94861  12.5
 3  Greece  1102  43477  5.7
 4  Malta  1425  40805  5.4
 5  Bahamas  1103  40667  5.4
 6  Cyprus  1440  34625  4.6
 7  Singapore  989  33241  4.4
 8  Norway  1178  33042  4.3
 9  Japan  3215  22599  3.0
 10  China, PR of  2098  22429  3.0
 11  United States  361  12769  1.7
 12  Philippines  969  11919  1.6
 13  Hong Kong  301  10891  1.4
 14  India  384  10766  1.4
 15  Marshall Islands  128  10663  1.4
 16  Saint Vincent  893  10226  1.3
 17  Turkey  898  9939  1.3
 18  Italy  651  8835  1.2
 19  Germany, FR  647  8810  1.2
 20  UK  472  8767  1.2
 21  Russia  1721  8225  1.1
 22  Taiwan  215  8171  1.1
 23  Korea, Rep  684  8020  1.1
 24  Bermuda  105  7653  1.0
 25  Malaysia  466  7448  1.0
 26  France  221  6957  0.9
 27  Denmark  502  6855  0.9
 28  Brazil  199  6370  0.8
 29  Iran  167  5680  0.7
 30  Netherlands  680  5613  0.7
 31  Antigua &
Barbuda
 601  4176  0.5
 32  Indonesia  1041  3988  0.5
 33  Kuwait  58  3900  0.5
 34  Thailand  419  3036  0.4
 35  Belize  757  2648  0.3
 36  Australia  106  2255  0.3
 37  Luxembourg  48  2123  0.3
 38  Egypt  206  1992  0.3
 39  Romania  178  1859  0.2
 40  Poland  96  1851  0.2
 Total top 40 flags  33419  719476  94.7
 Rest of the world  5413  40281  5.3
 
 Source: LMIS, 1999
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Annexe 3
  International conventions and Protocols ratified by India (Source DGS)
 INSTRUMENT In Force w.e.f. India’s position
1. International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea 1974 as amended.
25.5.1980 Ratified
2.Protocol of 1978 relating to the
International Convention for the Safety of
Life at sea,1974
1.5.1982 Ratified
3.Protocol of 1988relating to the
International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea 1974
4.Convention of the International
Regulations for the Preventing Collisions
at Sea, 1972 as amended. COLREG 1972
15.7.1977 Ratified
5.The protocol relating to the International
Convention for the Prevention of pollution
from ships, 1973 as amended ( Marpol
)amended 73/78
2.10.1983 Ratified
6.Convention on Facilitation of






8.Protocol of 1988 relating to the
International Convention
onLoadlines,1966
9.International Convention on Tonnage
Measurement of ships, 1969(Tonnage
1969)
18.7.82 Ratified
10. International Convention relating to
Intervention on the High Seas in cases of




11.Protocol relating to Intervention on
High seas in cases of pollution by
substances other than oil 1973.
30.3.83
12. International Convention on civil
liability for oil pollution damage, 1969
(CLC 1969)
19.6.75 Ratified
13. Protocol to the international
Convention on Civil Liabilities for oil
Pollution damage,1969 (CLC protocol
1976)
8.4.81 Ratified
14. Protocol of 1992 to amend the
international Convention on Civil Liability
30.5.96
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for oil pollution Damage 1969 (CLC
protocol 1992)
15.Special Trade Passenger Ships
Agreement,1971 (STP !971)
2.1.74 Ratified
16.Protocol for Space requirement for
special Trade Passenger Ships 1973
(Space STP 1973)
2.6.77 Ratified
17.Convention relating to Civil liability in





18.International Convention on the
establishment of an International Fund for
compensation of oil pollution Damage
1971 (Fund 1971)
16.10.78 Ratified
19.Protocol to the International convention
on the establishment of an international
Fund for compensation for oil pollution
damage 1971 (Fund protocol 1976)
22.11.94 Ratified
20 .Protocol 1992 to amend the
International Convention on the
establishment of an international Fund for
the compensation of Oil pollution Damage
1971 (Fund protocol 1992)
30.5.96.
21.International Convention for Safe
Containers ,1972as amended (CSC
Amended 1972)
6.9.77. Ratified
22. Athens Convention  relating to the
Carriage of passengers and their luggage
by Sea 1974 (PAL 19749
24.4.87 --
23.Protocol to the Athens Convention
relating to the carriage of passengers and
their luggage by sea 1974( PAL Protocol
1976)
30.4.89
24.Protocol of 1990 to amend the Athens
convention relating to the Carriage of
passengers and their luggage by sea
1974(PAL Protocol 1990)
Not yet in force
25.Convention Agreement on the
International Maritime Satellite
organisation  (INMARSAT ) as amended
16.7.79 Ratified





27.Convention on limitation of liability for
Maritime Claims 1976 (LMC1976)
1.12.86 --
28. International convention on Standards
of Training Certification and Watch –




29.International convention on Maritime
Search And rescue ,1979 (SAR !979)
22.6.85
30.Conventio for suppression of Unlawful
acts against the Safety of maritime
Navigation (SWA 1988)
1.3.92
31. Protocol for the suppression of
unlawful acts against the Safety of Fixed
platforms located on the Continental Shelf
( SWA Protocol 1988)
1.3.92
32. International convention on Salvage
1989 (Salvage 1989)
14.7.96 Ratified
33.Internatinal Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness response and co-operation
1990 (OPRC 1990)
13.5.95
34.Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by  Dumping of wastes,





35. International Convention on Standard
of Training Certification and Watch
Keeping for fishing vessels Personnel
(STCW –F)
Not yet in force Under
consideration
36. Terrmolinos Protocol  1993 relating to
the Terrmolinos International Convention
for the Safety of fishing Vessels 1977
(SFV Protocol 1993)
Not yet in force
Source: Annual report 1998-1999 0f Directorate General of Shipping.
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Annexe 4
Procedures responding to port State control, by IACS Members and
Associates.
IACS: Committed to co-operation
IACS members are committed to full co-operation with port State control authorities
and co-operation, assistance, strict reporting and data logging are all keys to IACS
formal procedure for responding to port State control.
One of seven IACS Marine Safety Initiatives formally implemented on 1 January
1996, this procedure is mandatory in the response of IACS Members and
Associates.
In brief summary, its detailed provisions are:
 A Port State request to attend on board a ship to assist with rectification’s of
provided deficiencies or other discrepancies will be dealt with promptly and
positively.
 IACS Members will Co-Operate and Assist during port State control inspection
by:
• Ensuring that Class surveyors attend the ship when deficiencies related to Class
and Statutory matters are found.
• Providing port State control inspectors with relevant information.
• Liasing with the Flag State in accordance with prior agreement and the owner’s
representative, to ensure that both are fully aware of actions being taken that
affect Class-related or Statutory related maters.
 In the context of Deficiencies:
• port State control inspectors will be urged to list deficiencies in relation to the
specific Convention certificate concerned.
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• Listings should indicate:
1) All relevant deficiencies in the port State control inspection report.
2) All deficiencies dealt with and details of actions taken for each, and
3) Any deficiencies which with agreement of the surveyors and port State control
inspectors, remain outstanding on the ship’s departure and which are subject to
special re-examination and attention by a specified date.
 In the context of DETENTION REPORTS AND STATISTICS:
• Reported deficiencies will be promptly analysed and the following actions taken:
1) Surveyors will provide detailed comments on any deficiencies of either class or
statutory nature within the purview of the classification society or authority
delegated to it and
2) The Flag State will be provided with an updated summary of any deficiencies
and actions taken.
3) Database of referred deficiencies will be maintained. Database information will
be able to show that recurring violations, by deficiency type and ship, are readily
identifiable and include data on agreed actions taken.
 In the context of PERFORMANCE, the relative performance of each IACS
Member and Associate in its port State control response and data logging
activity is monitored as part of IACS Quality system by the IACS Permanent
Secretariat.
• An IACS Society will cooperate fully in the process of correcting any Class
related safety deficiencies. The society may require corrective action(s), but
authorisation to instruct repair expenditure and ultimately for any deficiencies is
entirely that of the owner.
 In the context of RESPONSIBILITY IACS uses and supports the criteria of the
United States Coast Guard. In summary, these USCG principles are that:
• Interventions are conducted only when a vessel is unfit to proceed to sea or a
treat to the marine environment.
• Voyage damage will not be Class associated, unless other Class related
deficiencies are noted during a damage survey.
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• Equipment non-conformities will only be Class associated where equipment is
covered by a Class survey, or where Class has issued certification on behalf of a
Flag Administration.
• Where multiple deficiencies are noted, only those serious enough to justify
intervention will be evaluated to determine Class non-conformities.
• When the cause of an intervention, outdated equipment will not be associated
with Class non-conformity unless outdated at the time of the last survey
conducted by Class on behalf of the flag Administration.
• When the cause of the intervention, the absence of highly pilferable equipment,
it will generally not be listed as a Class non conformity, unless a large quantity is
missing, and inspection is taking place within 90 days after the last survey on
behalf of the Flag Administration.
• Expired certificates will not be associated with a Class non-conformity unless the
certificates were not endorsed or properly issued by the Class Society when
conducting the last survey on behalf of the Flag Administration.
• Interventions based on manning issues, whether conducted in accordance with
SOLAS or STCW, will not be listed as Class non-conformities.
• Of 90 days will generally be placed on non-conformities associated with
equipment failures, unless apparent that the deficiency is long standing.
• Failure of human factor-related testing will be associated with a Class non-
conformity only when the Class society issued the relevant certificate, and then
only for a specific period of 30 days.
• Serious wastage or other structural deficiencies not caused by voyage will be
listed as class non-conformity.
• In all cases of Class non- conformities, the classification Society will be notified
in writing. All cases should be subject to appeal to the relevant port State control
authority, and all appeals should receive a written response.
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Annexe 5




No. of ships with
deficiencies
No. of detentions*
American Bureau of Shipping 821 429 33
China Corporation Register of
Shipping ( Taiwan, China)
180 130 24
Bulgarski Koraben Register 33 23 2
Bureau Veritas 608 378 58
Hellenic Register of Shipping 16 14 4
Biro Klasifikasi Indonesia 37 28 11
Det Norske Veritas 783 375 35
Registrol Naval Roman 8 7 2
Germanischer Llyod 513 230 26
DDR Schiffs Revision und
klassification
50 26 1
Vietnam register of Shipping
(Dan Kiem Viet Nam)
38 35 18




Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1,356 699 69
Registro Cubano de Buques 3 2 0
Panama Bureau of Shipping 25 13 4
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai 4,274 2,302 199









Registro Italiano Navale 88 54 8
NV Unitas 1 1 0
Cyprus Bureau of Shipping 3 2 0
Maritime Register of Shipping
(Russia)
582 477 35
China Clasification Society 1,103 811 131
Indian Register of Shipping 57 46 3










Others 1,252 647 86
Total 12,957 7,518 830
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American Bureau of Shipping 914 514 44 4.81
China Corporation Register of
Shipping ( Taiwan, China)
186 132 20 10.75
Bulgarski Koraben Register 20 14 6 30
Bureau Veritas 665 447 57 8.57
Hellenic Register of Shipping 37 27 6 16.22
Biro Klasifikasi Indonesia 66 58 7 10.61
Det Norske Veritas 943 487 45 4.77
Registrol Naval Roman 3 3 0 0
Registro International Nvale
(RINAVE Portugeuesa) SARL
3 3 1 33.33
Germanischer Llyod 705 400 41 5.82
DDR Schiffs Revision und
klassification
13 8 0 0
Vietnam register of Shipping
(Dan Kiem Viet Nam)
34 30 7 20.59
Korean Register of Shipping 802 540 63 7.86
Ceskoslovensky Lodin
Register
2 5 0 0
Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1,583 910 0 0
Panama Bureau of Shipping 12 9 5 41.67
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai 5,186 3,002 244 4.70




47 45 8 17.02
Polski Rejestr statkow 27 16 5 18.52
Panama Maritime Surveyors
Bureau Inc
96 87 4 4.17
Registro Italiano Navale 123 90 19 15.45
INCLAMAR 1 1 1 100
Cyprus Bureau of Shipping 59 58 2 3.39
Maritime Register of Shipping
(Russia)
559 464 48 8.59
China Clasification Society 1,267 1,023 115 9.08
Indian Register of Shipping 44 34 3 6.82
Croatian Register of Shipping 17 7 0 0
Jugoslavenski registar
Brodova
Register of Shipping (North
Korea)
9 9 2 22.22
Rejnoj Registr RSFSR 1 1 0 0
Others 1,110 796 242 21.80
Total 14,545 9,226 1,061 7.29
Note: Deficiencies for which a ship is detained may not necessarily be related tot he matters
covered by the certificates issued by the classification society.
Source: Tokyo MOU Annual Report –1997-98
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Annex 6
ABS proposal for survey of older vessels:
• limit class transfer of vessels 15 years of age or older to a window of six months
following the Special Survey completion date unless an equivalent survey is
conducted at the time of transfer
• require two Surveyors to attend all tankers and bulk carriers for Special Survey
No.3 and for subsequent Intermediate and Special Surveys;
• strengthen the survey planning process by extending the requirements currently
applied to Special Survey to all Intermediate Surveys following Special Survey 3;
• require surveyors to make a photographic record of the vessel during Special
Survey No.3 and at subsequent Special and Intermediate Surveys. Photos to be
part of the survey report and vessel records;
• maintain Class Records, including thickness measurement reports and
photographs in simple, consistent computer format for the entire life of the
vessel. These records to be transferred at changes in ownership or class. These
records also to be available to flag State and Port State authorities on demand,
• further strengthen requirements governing the taking of thickness
measurements. Require the class surveyor to be on board the vessel and to
both direct and supervise the actions of the approved thickness measurement
firm. Thickness measurement reports, in simple and consistent computer format,
to be maintained on board the vessel and to be made available to flag State and
port State authorities on demand;
• strengthen the Special Survey requirements for tankers including the Condition
Assessment Program requirements (including a structural fatigue assessment),
at Special Survey No.3 and subsequent Special Surveys;
• internally examine all ballast tanks on an annual basis after Special Survey
No.3;
• strictly enforce requirements governing prompt and thorough repair and further
tighten them to limit the circumstances under which any further sea passage can
be under taken. A prompt and thorough repair is defined as a permanent repair,
completed at the time of the survey;
• develop guidelines for the application, maintenance and repair of coatings.
 (ABS press release)
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Annexe 7
As per the Asia Pacific studies conducted, the weakness in ISM Code
implementation are appended below:
a) Poor level of working knowledge of  the ISM Code within shipping companies:
This problem is pervasive, and it applies to the people both at sea and ashore. While
people have all heard of the ISM Code, participants argue that actual knowledge of
its 13 requirements, particularly their practical application, is very poor. Majority of
seafarers have had no ISM training, and many companies are introducing ISM
system without adequately preparing and training their staff. To make matter worse,
people ashore are said to have even  less knowledge of the ISM Code than seafarers
to develop real competition in ISM.
b). Lack of ISM training: Maritime-training institutions have not incorporated the
ISM Code into their curriculum. It is also argued that while STCW-95 does
incorporate ISM training, the current level of teaching and assessment provided by
many institutes does not enable seafarer to develop real competence in
ISM. Confounding the problem is the flag State inaction. While few flag States are
addressing ISM training many have done very little in improving ISM competence,
despite the evidence raised by many port State control inspection which show that
the seafarers are not competent in implementing the ISM Code.
c) Lack of Control over the auditing process: With respect to ISM audits, a main
criticism is the uneven quality of ISM auditors. While there are some good
experienced auditor around, there are also many that do the job without adequate
ISM auditing training and experience.
In many cases, this often results in auditors failing to make realistic judgements on
what are acceptable commercial shipping practices.
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Another main component is the lack of consistency among auditors, and this applies
even to those from the same auditing body. Not only does this often lead to greater
no. of deficiencies, but it also creates confusion over what is really required.
d) Shortcuts to ISM implementation: While there are many examples of shipping
companies that have gained a lot from implementing the ISM Code, these companies
are typically the better and more respected operators whose standards of safety are
always much higher than the average. As argued by a number of study participants,
the ship operators and crews who need it the most, the ones with low and
inacceptable safety standards, are the ones who have yet to fully embrace the ISM
Code. These operators may indeed have certified systems with all the proper
documentation to prove compliance but in reality, what they have are mere paper
systems, which neither reflect current operation nor work practices.
Among the group, it is becoming a cheap option to purchase a model system, make
some changes to it, and use it to get through the ISM audit. This, of course, defeats
the whole purpose of the ISM Code, which is to tailor the ISM system to an
organizations real business.
e) Negative attitude of seafarers. Largely as a result of the preceding problems,
seafarers in general regard the ISM Code in a harsh light. Because in many instances,
shore based management themselves do not understand or appreciate the ISM Code.
This lack of proper regards for its implementation caries over to ship personnel.
Given the general lack of training on the ISM code and what is seen as the additional
paper trail that its implementation requires, seafarers tend to view ISM Code





1. The Target Factor is in two parts:
Generic Factor-based on elements of the ships profile including the relevant priority
criteria.
History Factor-based on the ships inspection history in the Paris MOU.
2. The Generic Factor for an individual ship is calculated by adding together the
applicable elements of its profile according to the following table:
Element Target Factor
value














Targeted ship type (ie liable to
expanded inspection )
5








Not all conventions ratified 1
Class deficiency ratio above average 1
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3. Targeted flag-
Graduated for all targeted flags according to percentage above applicable 3-year
rolling average.
Targeted ship type-
i) Bulk carrier (type code40) more than 12 years.
ii) Gas carrier (type code20, 21,22) more than 10 years old.
iii) Chemical Tanker (type code30) more than 10 years old.
iv) Oil tanker (type code 11,12,13) more than 20 years old.
v) Passenger ship/ro-ro ferry(type code 70 &71)
Non EU recognised classification society-
A class society not appearing on the list of recognised societies published by EC
Commission. If no class is recorded in SIRENAC (other than withdrawal/suspension
of class for safety reasons) the ship will be assumed to be classed with an EU
recognised class society.
Ships more than 12 years old-
Graduated for non-targeted ship types and passenger ships
Not all conventions ratified-
Flag states who have not ratified all 7 main conventions.
Class deficiency ratio above average-
As identified in MOU annual deficiency statistics.
3. The Generic Factor is updated when the particulars of the ship change or the
status of its existing flag or class change.
 History Factor
4. The History Factor is  applied to the Generic Factor to reflect the actual condition
of the ship found by inspection.
5. The History Factor is calculated by applying the elements in the following table
to each Paris MOU inspection of the ship carried out in the previous 12 months.
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Element Target Value Remarks
1. Entering a region port for the
first time in the last 12 months
+20 No inspection recorded in
SIRENAC in the last 12
months.
2. Not inspected in last 6
months
+10 No inspection recorded in
SIRENAC in the last 6
months.
3. Detained +15 The values for
deficiencies and
outstanding deficiencies
(elements 4&5 below) are
added.















5. Outstanding deficiencies from
last inspection
+1
for each code 17 &
15 and for every two
16 and /or 99
-2
if code 12 present
(all defs. rectified)
The value for the
outstanding deficiencies is
applied only in respect of
the latest inspection.
6. The overall Target Factor is calculated by adding the Generic and History Factor
but cannot be less than the Generic Factor.







Source . IMO News
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Annexe 10
Questioner and Replies from the Secreraires of MOU’s
To,
The Secretary,
The Paris MOU, The Acuerdo de Vina del Mar, The Tokyo MOU, The Caribbean
MOU, The Mediterranean MOU, The Indian Ocean MOU, and The Abuja MOU.
Dear Sir,
I am a student at World Maritime University, Malmo, Sweden and as part of the
course, writing my dissertation. My topic is on port State control. I am enclosing a





e mail: S00073@ wmu.se
Fax: + 46 40 124827.
Questioner
• How far in your opinion, MOU’s between different States has helped in
eradicating sub-standard ships from your region?
• Does co-operation between MOU’s help in eradicating substandard ships?
• Will exchange of data between all MOU’s after inspection of the vessel by the
PSCO, help in keeping a track on substandard ship?
• In your opinion, will the common network of database be usefull, i.e all MOU’s
sending information to a common data base, not only for detained ships, but
also for ships inspected and not detained but with deficiencies.
• Is there a need for a Global MOU ? So as to have a common standard all over,
and also, to avoid duplication of inspection.
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From:           "Ning" <tmou.okada@nifty.ne.jp>
To:             "Dilip MEHROTRA" <S00073@wmu.se>
Subject:        Re: Questioner
Date sent:      Fri, 7 Apr 2000 13:57:39 +0900
Our reference: TMS00/113
Dear Mr. Mehrotra:
Reference of your message dated 6 April 2000, questionnaire on port State
control.
As requested, we would like to provide the following information for your
reference:
Questions 1 & 2
It is for sure that establishment and operation of the MOU would help to
eliminate substandard ships in the region. Now, under the Tokyo MOU, there
are more than 14,000 PSC inspections conducted by member Authorities
annually. And more than 50,000 deficiencies are found during inspections and
more than 1,000 detentions are made to substandard ships each year. This
could be seen as the clear indication of effectiveness of the MOU in
elimination of substandard ships.
Question 3
Exchange of PSC inspection information will provide a tool for tracking
substandard ships and targeting ships for inspection. It is advised that a
new PSC information system had been launched at the beginning of this year.
The new system is developed by using internet technology and would provide a
more efficient way and more user-friendly interface for data exchange and
input. The new system will ensure full inspection details be properly
recorded and storage of whole inspection history of ships.
Question 4
From our point of view, it would be important and useful to exchange
information between regional MOUs. At present, we have the agreement with
the Paris MOU for inter-regional data exchange. For data exchange between
all MOUs, it could be only possible when each MOU had established its
database system and accumulated enough data for exchange. Based on the




It is not clear for us what Global MOU means. If such a MOU would be a
worldwide organization on port State control, it would look not necessary.
Because, as the UN specialized agency, IMO is the international body
responsible for safety of shipping and protection of the marine environment
and the work of IMO covers both flag State implementation and port State
control. Therfore, we think IMO is the only appropriate international forum
to discuss port State control, rather than Global MOU. Of course, it would
be the most effective way to eliminate substandard ships if all regions
around the world established appropriate port State control system and a
worldwide port State control network could be formed in future. But it
should be understood that there is a quite long way to achieve this goal.








Date sent:      Mon, 10 Apr 2000 12:35:31 +0200
From:           Natascha Dofferhoff <natascha.dofferhoff@parismou.org>
To:             S00073@wmu.se
Subject:        Questioner
Dear Mr Mehrotra
Following your questions on your questioner I can inform you as follow.
Yes, the establishment of the Paris MOU has helped in eradicating
sub-standards ships from this region and also the co-operation with
other MOU's helps.
With the Tokyo MOU, the Paris MOU exchanges information , due to this it
is possible to keep track of sub-standard ships. However an inspection
in the Tokyo MOU will not be seen as an inspection in the Paris MOU.
The linking of databases from different MOU's could be an idea, with
this linking you can create some sort of Global MOU.
However a condition should be that all agreements of the MOU's are in
line with each other, that all inspection are performed in the same way




Paris MOU on Port State Control
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From:           "IOMOU" <iomou@goa1.dot.net.in>
To:             <S00073@wmu.se>
Subject:        Questionnaire on PSC
Date sent:      Thu, 13 Apr 2000 13:25:12 +0530
Dear Mr. Mehrotra, Appended below please find the reply to your questionnaire,
seriatim :
1)   This MOU is operational for just about a year. As such the statistical figures are
not avilable to give a positive reply. However, it felt that the system is effective, since
all the states in the region has started implementing PSC.
2)  The answer to this is same as above as the co-operation / harmonisation
between MOUs is yet to take shape.
3)  Affirmative.
4)  There may not be a common database but accessibility of data from any MOU
will be useful.
5)  Harmonisation of MOUs is being contemplated. Probably, IMO will be in a better
position to reply this.
Hope this helps you in your task.






From:           "Barrie Rial" <rial_wb@candw.ky>
To:             "Professor Mukherjee" <pkm@wmu.se>
Subject:        Response to Student's Questionnaire on PSC
Date sent:      Mon, 24 Jul 2000 03:30:33 -0400
Dear Mr Mehotra
I have recently received your questionnaire by fax from the WMU, which I
understand you sent to the Secretariat of the Caribbean MOU. I am sorry to
hear you did not yet receive a response. This is a ttached, and I trust
you will find it useful.
        a.. Question 1.
There is no doubt that an organised Port State Control (PSC) has assisted in
reducing the number of substandard ships operating world-wide. Such ships are not
yet however eradicated, but the more effective a given region’s PSC programme
and capability becomes, the less potential exists for substandard ships and
operators to ply that region unchallenged – as has been the case in the past.
It is difficult to quantify "how far" the eradication has progressed, for a number of
reasons. Firs t there was really no base figure to start from, though everyone
realised there were too many and substandard ships. Secondly, the statistics need
to be analysed and are subject to different interpretations. For example, when first
embarking on a PSC regional programme, what will be considered substandard are
the blatant offenders, and these will tend to receive priority attention. As the
standards increase, there will be a tendency to "move the goal posts", and ships that
at first were coincide red not that bad will receive more attention. This is evident in
Europe, where ships are being detained for matters which some years ago they
would not have been detained. This development may be partly politically driven (a
form of "unofficial cabotage" against ships the region would rather not have trading
in the region for economic reasons). On the other hand there are reports of
unabashed abuse of authority in the form of extortion, where a ship is threatened
with detention if certain "charges" are not paid, are forced to purchase unnecessary
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equipment or face costly delays. Both trends are worrying and perhaps it is time to
try and define what a substandard ship is; though admittedly this is a difficult and
contentious task.
a. Question 2
Again there is little doubt that co-operation between MOU’s assists ineradicating
substandard ships, since a joint effort can bring greater pressure on a substandard
ship to come up to an acceptable standard. This is in the context of a "bad" ship not
escaping attention in a neighbouring PSC region.
        a. Question 3
Again the exchange of data between all MOUs is bound to assist in keeping track of
a substandard ship. Indeed, I see this as a natural and necessary progression from
the regional to a global system of PSC programmes. It will also help to prevent
unnecessary inspections of "good" ships.
        a. Question 4
A common network of databases would assuredly be useful, to track both the bad
and the good ships, and again I see this as a necessary and inevitable progression
of the system. Given today’s advance d information technology, a global information
centre should not be difficult to achieve, and would probably be more cost effective
overall.
        a. Question 5
From the responses so far, it follows that the natural progression of the PSC
regional regimes is toward a global regime, though there will remain some
regionalisation since each region will have it s indigenous traders. This is with
respect to the "hardware" side of things – the actual inspection of ships. If a global
communications centre is properly set up, any region should be able to utilise it for
global or regional information.
Please note that these responses, whilst given from my perspective as
Chairman of the Caribbean MOU, are my own personal views, though I am
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sure they are shared by most members of the Caribbean MOU.
Best wishes with your work.
Kind regards




























































































































































































Australia * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Bangladesh * * * * * * *
Djibouti * * * * * *
Eritrea * * * * *
Ethiopia * * * * * * *
India * * * * * * * * * * *
Iran * * * * * * * *
Kenya * * * * * *
Maldives * * * * * *
Mauritius * * * * * * *
Mozambique * * * * * * *
Myanmar * * * * * * *
Seychelles * * * * * * * * *
South Africa * * * * * * * * *
Sri Lanka * * * * * * * *
Sudan * * * *
Tanzania * * *
















































































































































































































Australia * * * * * * * * * * * * * *




India * * * * * * *
Iran * * * * * *
Kenya * * * * *
Maldives * *
Mauritius * * * * * * * * *
Mozambique * * *
Myanmar *
Seychelles * * * *
South Africa * * * * * * * * * *
Sri Lanka * * * * * * * * * * *
Sudan
Tanzania































































































































































 Flags dominating world shipping
 
 Top 40 flags in 1999 (ships of 300 gt and over)
 Rank  Flag  No of Ships  Total DWT (000)  DWT % Share of World
Fleet
 1  Panama  5036  151323  19.9
 2  Liberia  1659  94861  12.5
 3  Greece  1102  43477  5.7
 4  Malta  1425  40805  5.4
 5  Bahamas  1103  40667  5.4
 6  Cyprus  1440  34625  4.6
 7  Singapore  989  33241  4.4
 8  Norway  1178  33042  4.3
 9  Japan  3215  22599  3.0
 10  China, PR of  2098  22429  3.0
 11  United States  361  12769  1.7
 12  Philippines  969  11919  1.6
 13  Hong Kong  301  10891  1.4
 14  India  384  10766  1.4
 15  Marshall Islands  128  10663  1.4
 16  Saint Vincent  893  10226  1.3
 17  Turkey  898  9939  1.3
 18  Italy  651  8835  1.2
 19  Germany, FR  647  8810  1.2
 20  UK  472  8767  1.2
 21  Russia  1721  8225  1.1
 22  Taiwan  215  8171  1.1
 23  Korea, Rep  684  8020  1.1
 24  Bermuda  105  7653  1.0
 25  Malaysia  466  7448  1.0
 26  France  221  6957  0.9
 27  Denmark  502  6855  0.9
 28  Brazil  199  6370  0.8
 29  Iran  167  5680  0.7
 30  Netherlands  680  5613  0.7
 31  Antigua &
Barbuda
 601  4176  0.5
 32  Indonesia  1041  3988  0.5
 33  Kuwait  58  3900  0.5
 34  Thailand  419  3036  0.4
 35  Belize  757  2648  0.3
 36  Australia  106  2255  0.3
 37  Luxembourg  48  2123  0.3
 38  Egypt  206  1992  0.3
 39  Romania  178  1859  0.2
 40  Poland  96  1851  0.2
 Total top 40 flags  33419  719476  94.7
 Rest of the world  5413  40281  5.3
 
 Source: LMIS, 1999
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Annexe 3
  International conventions and Protocols ratified by India (Source DGS)
 INSTRUMENT In Force w.e.f. India’s position
1. International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea 1974 as amended.
25.5.1980 Ratified
2.Protocol of 1978 relating to the
International Convention for the Safety of
Life at sea,1974
1.5.1982 Ratified
3.Protocol of 1988relating to the
International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea 1974
4.Convention of the International
Regulations for the Preventing Collisions
at Sea, 1972 as amended. COLREG 1972
15.7.1977 Ratified
5.The protocol relating to the International
Convention for the Prevention of pollution
from ships, 1973 as amended ( Marpol
)amended 73/78
2.10.1983 Ratified
6.Convention on Facilitation of






8.Protocol of 1988 relating to the
International Convention
onLoadlines,1966
9.International Convention on Tonnage
Measurement of ships, 1969(Tonnage
1969)
18.7.82 Ratified
10. International Convention relating to
Intervention on the High Seas in cases of




11.Protocol relating to Intervention on
High seas in cases of pollution by
substances other than oil 1973.
30.3.83
12. International Convention on civil
liability for oil pollution damage, 1969
(CLC 1969)
19.6.75 Ratified
13. Protocol to the international
Convention on Civil Liabilities for oil
Pollution damage,1969 (CLC protocol
1976)
8.4.81 Ratified
14. Protocol of 1992 to amend the
international Convention on Civil Liability
30.5.96
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for oil pollution Damage 1969 (CLC
protocol 1992)
15.Special Trade Passenger Ships
Agreement,1971 (STP !971)
2.1.74 Ratified
16.Protocol for Space requirement for
special Trade Passenger Ships 1973
(Space STP 1973)
2.6.77 Ratified
17.Convention relating to Civil liability in





18.International Convention on the
establishment of an International Fund for
compensation of oil pollution Damage
1971 (Fund 1971)
16.10.78 Ratified
19.Protocol to the International convention
on the establishment of an international
Fund for compensation for oil pollution
damage 1971 (Fund protocol 1976)
22.11.94 Ratified
20 .Protocol 1992 to amend the
International Convention on the
establishment of an international Fund for
the compensation of Oil pollution Damage
1971 (Fund protocol 1992)
30.5.96.
21.International Convention for Safe
Containers ,1972as amended (CSC
Amended 1972)
6.9.77. Ratified
22. Athens Convention  relating to the
Carriage of passengers and their luggage
by Sea 1974 (PAL 19749
24.4.87 --
23.Protocol to the Athens Convention
relating to the carriage of passengers and
their luggage by sea 1974( PAL Protocol
1976)
30.4.89
24.Protocol of 1990 to amend the Athens
convention relating to the Carriage of
passengers and their luggage by sea
1974(PAL Protocol 1990)
Not yet in force
25.Convention Agreement on the
International Maritime Satellite
organisation  (INMARSAT ) as amended
16.7.79 Ratified





27.Convention on limitation of liability for
Maritime Claims 1976 (LMC1976)
1.12.86 --
28. International convention on Standards
of Training Certification and Watch –




29.International convention on Maritime
Search And rescue ,1979 (SAR !979)
22.6.85
30.Conventio for suppression of Unlawful
acts against the Safety of maritime
Navigation (SWA 1988)
1.3.92
31. Protocol for the suppression of
unlawful acts against the Safety of Fixed
platforms located on the Continental Shelf
( SWA Protocol 1988)
1.3.92
32. International convention on Salvage
1989 (Salvage 1989)
14.7.96 Ratified
33.Internatinal Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness response and co-operation
1990 (OPRC 1990)
13.5.95
34.Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by  Dumping of wastes,





35. International Convention on Standard
of Training Certification and Watch
Keeping for fishing vessels Personnel
(STCW –F)
Not yet in force Under
consideration
36. Terrmolinos Protocol  1993 relating to
the Terrmolinos International Convention
for the Safety of fishing Vessels 1977
(SFV Protocol 1993)
Not yet in force
Source: Annual report 1998-1999 0f Directorate General of Shipping.
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Annexe 4
Procedures responding to port State control, by IACS Members and
Associates.
IACS: Committed to co-operation
IACS members are committed to full co-operation with port State control authorities
and co-operation, assistance, strict reporting and data logging are all keys to IACS
formal procedure for responding to port State control.
One of seven IACS Marine Safety Initiatives formally implemented on 1 January
1996, this procedure is mandatory in the response of IACS Members and
Associates.
In brief summary, its detailed provisions are:
 A Port State request to attend on board a ship to assist with rectification’s of
provided deficiencies or other discrepancies will be dealt with promptly and
positively.
 IACS Members will Co-Operate and Assist during port State control inspection
by:
• Ensuring that Class surveyors attend the ship when deficiencies related to Class
and Statutory matters are found.
• Providing port State control inspectors with relevant information.
• Liasing with the Flag State in accordance with prior agreement and the owner’s
representative, to ensure that both are fully aware of actions being taken that
affect Class-related or Statutory related maters.
 In the context of Deficiencies:
• port State control inspectors will be urged to list deficiencies in relation to the
specific Convention certificate concerned.
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• Listings should indicate:
1) All relevant deficiencies in the port State control inspection report.
2) All deficiencies dealt with and details of actions taken for each, and
3) Any deficiencies which with agreement of the surveyors and port State control
inspectors, remain outstanding on the ship’s departure and which are subject to
special re-examination and attention by a specified date.
 In the context of DETENTION REPORTS AND STATISTICS:
• Reported deficiencies will be promptly analysed and the following actions taken:
1) Surveyors will provide detailed comments on any deficiencies of either class or
statutory nature within the purview of the classification society or authority
delegated to it and
2) The Flag State will be provided with an updated summary of any deficiencies
and actions taken.
3) Database of referred deficiencies will be maintained. Database information will
be able to show that recurring violations, by deficiency type and ship, are readily
identifiable and include data on agreed actions taken.
 In the context of PERFORMANCE, the relative performance of each IACS
Member and Associate in its port State control response and data logging
activity is monitored as part of IACS Quality system by the IACS Permanent
Secretariat.
• An IACS Society will cooperate fully in the process of correcting any Class
related safety deficiencies. The society may require corrective action(s), but
authorisation to instruct repair expenditure and ultimately for any deficiencies is
entirely that of the owner.
 In the context of RESPONSIBILITY IACS uses and supports the criteria of the
United States Coast Guard. In summary, these USCG principles are that:
• Interventions are conducted only when a vessel is unfit to proceed to sea or a
treat to the marine environment.
• Voyage damage will not be Class associated, unless other Class related
deficiencies are noted during a damage survey.
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• Equipment non-conformities will only be Class associated where equipment is
covered by a Class survey, or where Class has issued certification on behalf of a
Flag Administration.
• Where multiple deficiencies are noted, only those serious enough to justify
intervention will be evaluated to determine Class non-conformities.
• When the cause of an intervention, outdated equipment will not be associated
with Class non-conformity unless outdated at the time of the last survey
conducted by Class on behalf of the flag Administration.
• When the cause of the intervention, the absence of highly pilferable equipment,
it will generally not be listed as a Class non conformity, unless a large quantity is
missing, and inspection is taking place within 90 days after the last survey on
behalf of the Flag Administration.
• Expired certificates will not be associated with a Class non-conformity unless the
certificates were not endorsed or properly issued by the Class Society when
conducting the last survey on behalf of the Flag Administration.
• Interventions based on manning issues, whether conducted in accordance with
SOLAS or STCW, will not be listed as Class non-conformities.
• Of 90 days will generally be placed on non-conformities associated with
equipment failures, unless apparent that the deficiency is long standing.
• Failure of human factor-related testing will be associated with a Class non-
conformity only when the Class society issued the relevant certificate, and then
only for a specific period of 30 days.
• Serious wastage or other structural deficiencies not caused by voyage will be
listed as class non-conformity.
• In all cases of Class non- conformities, the classification Society will be notified
in writing. All cases should be subject to appeal to the relevant port State control
authority, and all appeals should receive a written response.
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Annexe 5




No. of ships with
deficiencies
No. of detentions*
American Bureau of Shipping 821 429 33
China Corporation Register of
Shipping ( Taiwan, China)
180 130 24
Bulgarski Koraben Register 33 23 2
Bureau Veritas 608 378 58
Hellenic Register of Shipping 16 14 4
Biro Klasifikasi Indonesia 37 28 11
Det Norske Veritas 783 375 35
Registrol Naval Roman 8 7 2
Germanischer Llyod 513 230 26
DDR Schiffs Revision und
klassification
50 26 1
Vietnam register of Shipping
(Dan Kiem Viet Nam)
38 35 18




Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1,356 699 69
Registro Cubano de Buques 3 2 0
Panama Bureau of Shipping 25 13 4
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai 4,274 2,302 199









Registro Italiano Navale 88 54 8
NV Unitas 1 1 0
Cyprus Bureau of Shipping 3 2 0
Maritime Register of Shipping
(Russia)
582 477 35
China Clasification Society 1,103 811 131
Indian Register of Shipping 57 46 3










Others 1,252 647 86
Total 12,957 7,518 830
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American Bureau of Shipping 914 514 44 4.81
China Corporation Register of
Shipping ( Taiwan, China)
186 132 20 10.75
Bulgarski Koraben Register 20 14 6 30
Bureau Veritas 665 447 57 8.57
Hellenic Register of Shipping 37 27 6 16.22
Biro Klasifikasi Indonesia 66 58 7 10.61
Det Norske Veritas 943 487 45 4.77
Registrol Naval Roman 3 3 0 0
Registro International Nvale
(RINAVE Portugeuesa) SARL
3 3 1 33.33
Germanischer Llyod 705 400 41 5.82
DDR Schiffs Revision und
klassification
13 8 0 0
Vietnam register of Shipping
(Dan Kiem Viet Nam)
34 30 7 20.59
Korean Register of Shipping 802 540 63 7.86
Ceskoslovensky Lodin
Register
2 5 0 0
Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1,583 910 0 0
Panama Bureau of Shipping 12 9 5 41.67
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai 5,186 3,002 244 4.70




47 45 8 17.02
Polski Rejestr statkow 27 16 5 18.52
Panama Maritime Surveyors
Bureau Inc
96 87 4 4.17
Registro Italiano Navale 123 90 19 15.45
INCLAMAR 1 1 1 100
Cyprus Bureau of Shipping 59 58 2 3.39
Maritime Register of Shipping
(Russia)
559 464 48 8.59
China Clasification Society 1,267 1,023 115 9.08
Indian Register of Shipping 44 34 3 6.82
Croatian Register of Shipping 17 7 0 0
Jugoslavenski registar
Brodova
Register of Shipping (North
Korea)
9 9 2 22.22
Rejnoj Registr RSFSR 1 1 0 0
Others 1,110 796 242 21.80
Total 14,545 9,226 1,061 7.29
Note: Deficiencies for which a ship is detained may not necessarily be related tot he matters
covered by the certificates issued by the classification society.
Source: Tokyo MOU Annual Report –1997-98
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Annex 6
ABS proposal for survey of older vessels:
• limit class transfer of vessels 15 years of age or older to a window of six months
following the Special Survey completion date unless an equivalent survey is
conducted at the time of transfer
• require two Surveyors to attend all tankers and bulk carriers for Special Survey
No.3 and for subsequent Intermediate and Special Surveys;
• strengthen the survey planning process by extending the requirements currently
applied to Special Survey to all Intermediate Surveys following Special Survey 3;
• require surveyors to make a photographic record of the vessel during Special
Survey No.3 and at subsequent Special and Intermediate Surveys. Photos to be
part of the survey report and vessel records;
• maintain Class Records, including thickness measurement reports and
photographs in simple, consistent computer format for the entire life of the
vessel. These records to be transferred at changes in ownership or class. These
records also to be available to flag State and Port State authorities on demand,
• further strengthen requirements governing the taking of thickness
measurements. Require the class surveyor to be on board the vessel and to
both direct and supervise the actions of the approved thickness measurement
firm. Thickness measurement reports, in simple and consistent computer format,
to be maintained on board the vessel and to be made available to flag State and
port State authorities on demand;
• strengthen the Special Survey requirements for tankers including the Condition
Assessment Program requirements (including a structural fatigue assessment),
at Special Survey No.3 and subsequent Special Surveys;
• internally examine all ballast tanks on an annual basis after Special Survey
No.3;
• strictly enforce requirements governing prompt and thorough repair and further
tighten them to limit the circumstances under which any further sea passage can
be under taken. A prompt and thorough repair is defined as a permanent repair,
completed at the time of the survey;
• develop guidelines for the application, maintenance and repair of coatings.
 (ABS press release)
123
Annexe 7
As per the Asia Pacific studies conducted, the weakness in ISM Code
implementation are appended below:
a) Poor level of working knowledge of  the ISM Code within shipping companies:
This problem is pervasive, and it applies to the people both at sea and ashore. While
people have all heard of the ISM Code, participants argue that actual knowledge of
its 13 requirements, particularly their practical application, is very poor. Majority of
seafarers have had no ISM training, and many companies are introducing ISM
system without adequately preparing and training their staff. To make matter worse,
people ashore are said to have even  less knowledge of the ISM Code than seafarers
to develop real competition in ISM.
b). Lack of ISM training: Maritime-training institutions have not incorporated the
ISM Code into their curriculum. It is also argued that while STCW-95 does
incorporate ISM training, the current level of teaching and assessment provided by
many institutes does not enable seafarer to develop real competence in
ISM. Confounding the problem is the flag State inaction. While few flag States are
addressing ISM training many have done very little in improving ISM competence,
despite the evidence raised by many port State control inspection which show that
the seafarers are not competent in implementing the ISM Code.
c) Lack of Control over the auditing process: With respect to ISM audits, a main
criticism is the uneven quality of ISM auditors. While there are some good
experienced auditor around, there are also many that do the job without adequate
ISM auditing training and experience.
In many cases, this often results in auditors failing to make realistic judgements on
what are acceptable commercial shipping practices.
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Another main component is the lack of consistency among auditors, and this applies
even to those from the same auditing body. Not only does this often lead to greater
no. of deficiencies, but it also creates confusion over what is really required.
d) Shortcuts to ISM implementation: While there are many examples of shipping
companies that have gained a lot from implementing the ISM Code, these companies
are typically the better and more respected operators whose standards of safety are
always much higher than the average. As argued by a number of study participants,
the ship operators and crews who need it the most, the ones with low and
inacceptable safety standards, are the ones who have yet to fully embrace the ISM
Code. These operators may indeed have certified systems with all the proper
documentation to prove compliance but in reality, what they have are mere paper
systems, which neither reflect current operation nor work practices.
Among the group, it is becoming a cheap option to purchase a model system, make
some changes to it, and use it to get through the ISM audit. This, of course, defeats
the whole purpose of the ISM Code, which is to tailor the ISM system to an
organizations real business.
e) Negative attitude of seafarers. Largely as a result of the preceding problems,
seafarers in general regard the ISM Code in a harsh light. Because in many instances,
shore based management themselves do not understand or appreciate the ISM Code.
This lack of proper regards for its implementation caries over to ship personnel.
Given the general lack of training on the ISM code and what is seen as the additional
paper trail that its implementation requires, seafarers tend to view ISM Code





1. The Target Factor is in two parts:
Generic Factor-based on elements of the ships profile including the relevant priority
criteria.
History Factor-based on the ships inspection history in the Paris MOU.
2. The Generic Factor for an individual ship is calculated by adding together the
applicable elements of its profile according to the following table:
Element Target Factor
value














Targeted ship type (ie liable to
expanded inspection )
5








Not all conventions ratified 1
Class deficiency ratio above average 1
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3. Targeted flag-
Graduated for all targeted flags according to percentage above applicable 3-year
rolling average.
Targeted ship type-
i) Bulk carrier (type code40) more than 12 years.
ii) Gas carrier (type code20, 21,22) more than 10 years old.
iii) Chemical Tanker (type code30) more than 10 years old.
iv) Oil tanker (type code 11,12,13) more than 20 years old.
v) Passenger ship/ro-ro ferry(type code 70 &71)
Non EU recognised classification society-
A class society not appearing on the list of recognised societies published by EC
Commission. If no class is recorded in SIRENAC (other than withdrawal/suspension
of class for safety reasons) the ship will be assumed to be classed with an EU
recognised class society.
Ships more than 12 years old-
Graduated for non-targeted ship types and passenger ships
Not all conventions ratified-
Flag states who have not ratified all 7 main conventions.
Class deficiency ratio above average-
As identified in MOU annual deficiency statistics.
3. The Generic Factor is updated when the particulars of the ship change or the
status of its existing flag or class change.
 History Factor
4. The History Factor is  applied to the Generic Factor to reflect the actual condition
of the ship found by inspection.
5. The History Factor is calculated by applying the elements in the following table
to each Paris MOU inspection of the ship carried out in the previous 12 months.
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Element Target Value Remarks
1. Entering a region port for the
first time in the last 12 months
+20 No inspection recorded in
SIRENAC in the last 12
months.
2. Not inspected in last 6
months
+10 No inspection recorded in
SIRENAC in the last 6
months.
3. Detained +15 The values for
deficiencies and
outstanding deficiencies
(elements 4&5 below) are
added.















5. Outstanding deficiencies from
last inspection
+1
for each code 17 &
15 and for every two
16 and /or 99
-2
if code 12 present
(all defs. rectified)
The value for the
outstanding deficiencies is
applied only in respect of
the latest inspection.
6. The overall Target Factor is calculated by adding the Generic and History Factor
but cannot be less than the Generic Factor.







Source . IMO News
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Annexe 10
Questioner and Replies from the Secreraires of MOU’s
To,
The Secretary,
The Paris MOU, The Acuerdo de Vina del Mar, The Tokyo MOU, The Caribbean
MOU, The Mediterranean MOU, The Indian Ocean MOU, and The Abuja MOU.
Dear Sir,
I am a student at World Maritime University, Malmo, Sweden and as part of the
course, writing my dissertation. My topic is on port State control. I am enclosing a





e mail: S00073@ wmu.se
Fax: + 46 40 124827.
Questioner
• How far in your opinion, MOU’s between different States has helped in
eradicating sub-standard ships from your region?
• Does co-operation between MOU’s help in eradicating substandard ships?
• Will exchange of data between all MOU’s after inspection of the vessel by the
PSCO, help in keeping a track on substandard ship?
• In your opinion, will the common network of database be usefull, i.e all MOU’s
sending information to a common data base, not only for detained ships, but
also for ships inspected and not detained but with deficiencies.
• Is there a need for a Global MOU ? So as to have a common standard all over,
and also, to avoid duplication of inspection.
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From:           "Ning" <tmou.okada@nifty.ne.jp>
To:             "Dilip MEHROTRA" <S00073@wmu.se>
Subject:        Re: Questioner
Date sent:      Fri, 7 Apr 2000 13:57:39 +0900
Our reference: TMS00/113
Dear Mr. Mehrotra:
Reference of your message dated 6 April 2000, questionnaire on port State
control.
As requested, we would like to provide the following information for your
reference:
Questions 1 & 2
It is for sure that establishment and operation of the MOU would help to
eliminate substandard ships in the region. Now, under the Tokyo MOU, there
are more than 14,000 PSC inspections conducted by member Authorities
annually. And more than 50,000 deficiencies are found during inspections and
more than 1,000 detentions are made to substandard ships each year. This
could be seen as the clear indication of effectiveness of the MOU in
elimination of substandard ships.
Question 3
Exchange of PSC inspection information will provide a tool for tracking
substandard ships and targeting ships for inspection. It is advised that a
new PSC information system had been launched at the beginning of this year.
The new system is developed by using internet technology and would provide a
more efficient way and more user-friendly interface for data exchange and
input. The new system will ensure full inspection details be properly
recorded and storage of whole inspection history of ships.
Question 4
From our point of view, it would be important and useful to exchange
information between regional MOUs. At present, we have the agreement with
the Paris MOU for inter-regional data exchange. For data exchange between
all MOUs, it could be only possible when each MOU had established its
database system and accumulated enough data for exchange. Based on the




It is not clear for us what Global MOU means. If such a MOU would be a
worldwide organization on port State control, it would look not necessary.
Because, as the UN specialized agency, IMO is the international body
responsible for safety of shipping and protection of the marine environment
and the work of IMO covers both flag State implementation and port State
control. Therfore, we think IMO is the only appropriate international forum
to discuss port State control, rather than Global MOU. Of course, it would
be the most effective way to eliminate substandard ships if all regions
around the world established appropriate port State control system and a
worldwide port State control network could be formed in future. But it
should be understood that there is a quite long way to achieve this goal.








Date sent:      Mon, 10 Apr 2000 12:35:31 +0200
From:           Natascha Dofferhoff <natascha.dofferhoff@parismou.org>
To:             S00073@wmu.se
Subject:        Questioner
Dear Mr Mehrotra
Following your questions on your questioner I can inform you as follow.
Yes, the establishment of the Paris MOU has helped in eradicating
sub-standards ships from this region and also the co-operation with
other MOU's helps.
With the Tokyo MOU, the Paris MOU exchanges information , due to this it
is possible to keep track of sub-standard ships. However an inspection
in the Tokyo MOU will not be seen as an inspection in the Paris MOU.
The linking of databases from different MOU's could be an idea, with
this linking you can create some sort of Global MOU.
However a condition should be that all agreements of the MOU's are in
line with each other, that all inspection are performed in the same way




Paris MOU on Port State Control
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From:           "IOMOU" <iomou@goa1.dot.net.in>
To:             <S00073@wmu.se>
Subject:        Questionnaire on PSC
Date sent:      Thu, 13 Apr 2000 13:25:12 +0530
Dear Mr. Mehrotra, Appended below please find the reply to your questionnaire,
seriatim :
1)   This MOU is operational for just about a year. As such the statistical figures are
not avilable to give a positive reply. However, it felt that the system is effective, since
all the states in the region has started implementing PSC.
2)  The answer to this is same as above as the co-operation / harmonisation
between MOUs is yet to take shape.
3)  Affirmative.
4)  There may not be a common database but accessibility of data from any MOU
will be useful.
5)  Harmonisation of MOUs is being contemplated. Probably, IMO will be in a better
position to reply this.
Hope this helps you in your task.






From:           "Barrie Rial" <rial_wb@candw.ky>
To:             "Professor Mukherjee" <pkm@wmu.se>
Subject:        Response to Student's Questionnaire on PSC
Date sent:      Mon, 24 Jul 2000 03:30:33 -0400
Dear Mr Mehotra
I have recently received your questionnaire by fax from the WMU, which I
understand you sent to the Secretariat of the Caribbean MOU. I am sorry to
hear you did not yet receive a response. This is a ttached, and I trust
you will find it useful.
        a.. Question 1.
There is no doubt that an organised Port State Control (PSC) has assisted in
reducing the number of substandard ships operating world-wide. Such ships are not
yet however eradicated, but the more effective a given region’s PSC programme
and capability becomes, the less potential exists for substandard ships and
operators to ply that region unchallenged – as has been the case in the past.
It is difficult to quantify "how far" the eradication has progressed, for a number of
reasons. Firs t there was really no base figure to start from, though everyone
realised there were too many and substandard ships. Secondly, the statistics need
to be analysed and are subject to different interpretations. For example, when first
embarking on a PSC regional programme, what will be considered substandard are
the blatant offenders, and these will tend to receive priority attention. As the
standards increase, there will be a tendency to "move the goal posts", and ships that
at first were coincide red not that bad will receive more attention. This is evident in
Europe, where ships are being detained for matters which some years ago they
would not have been detained. This development may be partly politically driven (a
form of "unofficial cabotage" against ships the region would rather not have trading
in the region for economic reasons). On the other hand there are reports of
unabashed abuse of authority in the form of extortion, where a ship is threatened
with detention if certain "charges" are not paid, are forced to purchase unnecessary
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equipment or face costly delays. Both trends are worrying and perhaps it is time to
try and define what a substandard ship is; though admittedly this is a difficult and
contentious task.
a. Question 2
Again there is little doubt that co-operation between MOU’s assists ineradicating
substandard ships, since a joint effort can bring greater pressure on a substandard
ship to come up to an acceptable standard. This is in the context of a "bad" ship not
escaping attention in a neighbouring PSC region.
        a. Question 3
Again the exchange of data between all MOUs is bound to assist in keeping track of
a substandard ship. Indeed, I see this as a natural and necessary progression from
the regional to a global system of PSC programmes. It will also help to prevent
unnecessary inspections of "good" ships.
        a. Question 4
A common network of databases would assuredly be useful, to track both the bad
and the good ships, and again I see this as a necessary and inevitable progression
of the system. Given today’s advance d information technology, a global information
centre should not be difficult to achieve, and would probably be more cost effective
overall.
        a. Question 5
From the responses so far, it follows that the natural progression of the PSC
regional regimes is toward a global regime, though there will remain some
regionalisation since each region will have it s indigenous traders. This is with
respect to the "hardware" side of things – the actual inspection of ships. If a global
communications centre is properly set up, any region should be able to utilise it for
global or regional information.
Please note that these responses, whilst given from my perspective as
Chairman of the Caribbean MOU, are my own personal views, though I am
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sure they are shared by most members of the Caribbean MOU.
Best wishes with your work.
Kind regards
Captain W B Rial
Chairman
Caribbean PSC Committee
